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VIEWS	AMONG	COLLEGE	STUDENTS	REGARDING	FREEDOM	OF	EXPRESSION:	AN	
ANALYSIS	IN	LIGHT	OF	KEY	SUPREME	COURT	DECISIONS	
John	Villasenor1	
ABSTRACT	
This	Essay	presents	and	analyzes	results	from	an	August	2017	survey	of	
1,500	current	students	at	U.S.	four-year	colleges	and	universities	regarding	
freedom	of	expression	under	the	First	Amendment.	The	survey	was	designed	
to	enable	an	examination	of	those	views	in	light	of	key	Supreme	Court	prec-
edents	on	issues	including	“true	threats,”	incitements	to	imminent	lawless	
action,	and	defamation.	The	results	indicate	that	the	common	stereotype—
that	students	have	an	overly	narrow	view	of	First	Amendment	freedoms—
while	correct	in	some	respects,	is	also	an	oversimplification.	A	more	accu-
rate	characterization	 is	 that	many	students	hold	views	on	 freedom	of	ex-
pression	 that	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 First	 Amendment—
overly	narrow	in	relation	to	expression	that	they	deem	offensive,	but	overly	
broad	in	relation	to	defamation	and	incitements	to	imminent	lawless	action.	
	 	
	
	1	 Professor	of	Engineering,	Public	Policy,	and	Management;	Visiting	Professor	of	Law,	UCLA;	Non-
resident	Senior	Fellow,	the	Brookings	Institution;	Visiting	Fellow,	the	Hoover	Institution.	The	views	
presented	herein	are	those	of	the	author.	Financial	support	for	conducting	the	survey	presented	
herein	was	provided	by	the	Charles	Koch	Foundation	to	UCLA.	The	Charles	Koch	Foundation	had	
no	involvement	in	designing	the	survey,	conducting	the	survey,	or	analyzing	the	results.	Thanks	
to	Kelsey	Ann	Naughton	of	the	Foundation	for	Individual	Rights	in	Education	(FIRE)	for	valuable	
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INTRODUCTION	
Freedom	of	expression	on	college	campuses2	has	recently	been	a	prom-
inent	topic	of	discussion	both	in	the	higher	education	community	and	be-
yond.	Anecdotal	examples	abound	of	campus	events—including	at	public	
institutions	 that	 have	 First	 Amendment	 obligations—in	 which	 speakers	
holding	views	considered	offensive	have	been	prevented	from	speaking.3	
This	has	contributed	to	a	broader	narrative	under	which	colleges	are	often	
portrayed	as	places	where	freedom	of	expression	is	under	threat.		
College	students’	attitudes	toward	the	First	Amendment	are	of	critical	
importance	 in	determining	 the	on-campus	climate	 for	 free	 speech.	Addi-
tionally,	 because	 today’s	 college	 students	 are	 tomorrow’s	 policymakers,	
legislators,	teachers,	and	judges,	their	views	will	have	an	important	impact	
on	the	broader	societal	climate	for	free	speech	in	the	coming	decades.	
This	Essay	presents	 the	results	and	analysis	of	a	survey4	 that	was	de-
signed	with	the	specific	goal	of	exploring	views	among	college	students	re-
garding	the	scope	of	freedom	of	expression	under	the	First	Amendment	in	
the	context	of	key	Supreme	Court	decisions.	While	this	is	believed	to	be	the	
first	survey	designed	specifically	to	explore	student	views	of	free	speech	in	
light	of	those	Supreme	Court	First	Amendment	precedents,	it	is	not	the	first	
survey	to	examine	the	broader	issue	of	perceptions	regarding	the	freedom	
of	expression	among	college	students.	 In	September	2015,	McLaughlin	&	
Associates	conducted	a	survey	(hereafter,	“McLaughlin	2015”)	of	800	un-
dergraduates	under	sponsorship	from	the	William	F.	Buckley,	Jr.	Program	
at	Yale	University.5	 In	early	2016,	Gallup,	 the	Knight	Foundation,	and	the	
Newseum	Institute	published	the	results	of	a	survey	(“Gallup	2016”)	of	over	
	
	2	 In	the	remainder	of	this	essay,	“college”	will	be	used	to	refer	to	both	colleges	as	well	as	to	univer-
sities	that	have	four-year	undergraduate	programs.		
	3	 See,	e.g.,	Thomas	Fuller,	Berkeley	Cancels	Ann	Coulter	Speech	Over	Safety	Fears,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Apr.	
19,	 2017),	 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/us/berkeley-ann-coulter-speech-can-
celed.html;	Peter	Beinart,	A	Violent	Attack	on	Free	Speech	at	Middlebury,	THE	ATLANTIC	(Mar.	6,	
2017),	 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/middlebury-free-speech-vio-
lence/518667/;	Howard	Blume,	Protesters	disrupt	talk	by	pro-police	author,	sparking	free-speech	
debate	 at	 Claremont	 McKenna	 College,	 L.A.	 TIMES	 (Apr.	 9,	 2017,	 10:20	 AM),	
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-macdonald-claremont-speech-disrupted-
20170408-story.html.	 See	 also	 Disinvitation	 Database,	 FOUND.	 FOR	 INDIVIDUAL	 RIGHTS	 IN	 EDUC.,	
https://www.thefire.org/resources/disinvitation-database/	(last	visited	Dec.	9,	2017).	
	4	 A	short	summary	of	a	subset	of	the	results	from	this	survey	were	presented	in	John	Villasenor,	
Views	among	college	students	regarding	the	First	Amendment:	Results	 from	a	new	survey,	THE	
BROOKINGS	 INST.	 (Sept.	 18,	 2017),	 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/09/18/views-
among-college-students-regarding-the-first-amendment-results-from-a-new-survey/.		
	5	 JIM	MCLAUGHLIN	&	 ROB	 SCHMIDT,	MCLAUGHLIN	&	ASSOC.,	 NATIONAL	UNDERGRADUATE	 STUDY	 (Oct.	 26,	
2015),	 https://www.dropbox.com/s/sfmpoeytvqc3cl2/NATL%20College%2010-25-
15%20Presentation.pdf.	See	also	Notable	&	Quotable:	Unfree	Speech	on	Campus,	WALL	ST.	J.	(Oct.	
22,	 2015,	 7:15	 PM),	 http://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotable-unfree-speech-on-campus-
1445555707.	
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3,000	college	students.6	In	addition,	in	May	2017,	the	Panetta	Institute	for	
Public	 Policy	 and	Hart	Research	Associates,	which	have	been	 conducting	
surveys	of	college	students	regarding	free	speech	for	many	years,	published	
results	of	their	2017	survey	(“Panetta	2017”)	of	802	college	students.7	
At	least	three	surveys	on	the	attitudes	of	college	students	toward	free	
expression	were	released	in	the	fall	of	2017.	In	addition	to	the	survey	that	
is	 the	 focus	of	 this	 Essay	 (which	will	 be	 referred	 to	herein	as	 “Villasenor	
2017”	to	distinguish	it	from	the	other	surveys	cited	in	this	Essay),	in	October	
2017,	the	Foundation	for	Individual	Rights	in	Education	(FIRE)	released	the	
results	 of	 a	 survey	 (“FIRE	 2017”)	 conducted	 in	May	 and	 June	of	 2017	of	
1,250	 undergraduates	 at	 two-	 and	 four-year	 institutions	 in	 the	 United	
States.8	 In	 September	 2017,	McLaughlin	&	Associates	 conducted	 and	 re-
leased	results	of	a	national	survey	(“McLaughlin	2017”)	of	800	undergradu-
ates.9	Additionally,	some	of	the	survey	questions	 in	Villasenor	2017	were	
replicated	by	The	Economist	and	YouGov	in	a	late	September	2017	survey	
(“Economist/YouGov	2017”)	of	1,500	American	adults.10	Another	resource	
is	the	set	of	annual	surveys	that	have	been	conducted	for	multiple	decades	
by	the	Higher	Education	Research	Institute	(HERI)	at	UCLA.11	The	HERI	ques-
tions	address	a	broad	range	of	topics,	including	some	relevant	to	freedom	
of	expression.12	Other	useful	points	of	reference	include	a	2010	publication	
	
	6	 GALLUP,	KNIGHT	FOUND.,	AND	THE	NEWSEUM	INST.,	FREE	EXPRESSION	ON	CAMPUS:	A	SURVEY	OF	U.S.	COLLEGE	
STUDENTS	 AND	 U.S.	 ADULTS	 (2016),	 https://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publica-
tion_pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf.	See	also	Vann	R.	Newkirk	II,	A	Free-Speech	Debate	Devoid	of	
Facts,	 THE	ATLANTIC	 (Apr.	 7,	 2016),	 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/first-
amendment-college-campus-millennials/477171/.	
	7	 HART	 RESEARCH	 ASSOC.	 ON	 BEHALF	 OF	 THE	 PANETTA	 INST.	 FOR	 PUB.	 POLICY,	 2017	 SURVEY	 OF	 AMERICA’S	
COLLEGE	STUDENTS	(May	2017),	http://www.panettainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Youth-Civic-
Engagement-Survey-Report-2017.pdf.	Panetta	and	Hart	have	been	conducting	annual	surveys	of	
college	students	for	many	years,	so	there	are	also	Panetta/Hart	surveys	available	from	2016	and	
earlier.	
	8	 KELSEY	ANN	NAUGHTON,	FOUND.	FOR	INDIVIDUAL	RIGHTS	IN	EDUC.,	SPEAKING	FREELY:	WHAT	STUDENTS	THINK	
ABOUT	 EXPRESSION	 AT	 AMERICAN	 COLLEGES	 (Oct.	 2017),	 https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/11091747/survey-2017-speaking-freely.pdf.	
	9	 JIM	MCLAUGHLIN	&	ROB	SCHMIDT,	MCLAUGHLIN	&	ASSOC.,	NATIONAL	UNDERGRADUATE	STUDY	 (Sept.	 28,	
2017),	 http://c8.nrostatic.com/sites/default/files/NATL%20Undergrad%209-27-
17%20Presentation%20%281%29.pdf.		
	10	 YOUGOV	 SPONSORED	 BY	 THE	 ECONOMIST,	 POLL:	 SEPT.	 24-26,	 2017,	 https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloud-
front.net/cumulus_uploads/document/qok43jc8xn/econTabReport.pdf.	 While	 most	 of	 the	 re-
spondents	to	the	Economist/YouGov	2017	poll	are	presumably	not	college	students,	the	results	
for	the	18-29	age	group	are	particularly	relevant	to	the	college	population.	
	11	 KEVIN	EAGAN	ET	AL.,	HIGHER	EDUC.	RESEARCH	INST.,	THE	AMERICAN	FRESHMAN:	NATIONAL	NORMS	FALL	2016	
(2017),	https://www.heri.ucla.edu/monographs/TheAmericanFreshman2016.pdf.		
	12	 For	example,	the	2016	HERI	survey	included	questions	related	to	“tolerance	of	others	with	differ-
ent	beliefs”	and	“openness	to	having	my	own	views	challenged.”	Id.	at	6.	
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on	campus	climate	from	the	Association	of	American	Colleges	&	Universi-
ties13	and	the	2011	book	“The	Still	Divided	Academy.”14	
As	noted	above,	the	Villasenor	2017	survey	differs	from	other	surveys	
in	that	it	was	designed	specifically	to	explore	students’	views	of	freedom	of	
expression	under	the	First	Amendment	in	light	of	key	Supreme	Court	prec-
edents.	Of	course,	it	would	not	be	reasonable	to	simply	ask	undergraduate	
students	about	those	precedents,	as	the	majority	of	students	would	likely	
not	be	able	to	answer	questions	such	as	“what	is	your	opinion	of	the	1969	
Brandenburg	decision?”15	or	“do	you	think	 ‘true	threats’	that	are	outside	
the	scope	of	First	Amendment	protection	should	be	evaluated	using	a	sub-
jective	or	an	objective	standard?”	Thus,	the	approach	instead	was	to	con-
struct	a	series	of	short	vignettes,	readily	understandable	to	a	person	with	
no	legal	background,	that	would	elicit	responses	enabling	a	comparison	be-
tween	the	perceived	scope	of	free	expression	and	the	actual	scope	as	artic-
ulated	through	Supreme	Court	jurisprudence.	
The	overarching	conclusions	from	the	analysis	presented	herein	are	as	
follows:	First,	many	students	have	an	overly	narrow	understanding	of	First	
Amendment	protections	with	respect	to	offensive	speech.	This	was	evident	
in	the	answers	to	questions	regarding	topics	including	hate	speech,	coun-
terpoints,	and	online	speech.	Second,	many	students	have	an	overly	broad	
view	of	some	aspects	of	expression,	believing,	 for	example,	 that,	at	 least	
under	certain	circumstances,	defamation	and	incitement	to	imminent	law-
less	action	are,	or	should	be,	constitutionally	protected.	Third,	with	respect	
to	“true	threats,”	students	display	substantial	uncertainty	whether	a	sub-
jective	or	objective	standard	should	be	applied.	This	uncertainty	is	unsur-
prising	given	that	courts	of	appeal	have	reached	conflicting	conclusions	on	
this	point.		
The	remainder	of	this	Essay	is	organized	as	follows:	Section	I	discusses	
methodology	and	includes	a	high-level	overview	of	the	topics	addressed	in	
the	survey	questions.	The	subsequent	sections	respectively	address	incite-
ments	 to	 imminent	 lawless	 action	 and	 (separately)	 defamation,	 online	
speech,	 “true	 threats,”	and	 several	other	 forms	of	offensive	 speech.	The	
final	section	offers	conclusions	as	well	as	some	recommended	courses	of	
action	considering	the	results.	
	
	13	 ERIC	L.	DEY	ET	AL.,	ASS’N	OF	AM.	COLLS.	AND	UNIVS.,	ENGAGING	DIVERSE	VIEWPOINTS:	WHAT	IS	THE	CAMPUS	
CLIMATE	FOR	PERSPECTIVE-TAKING?	(2010),	https://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/files/core_com-
mitments/engaging_diverse_viewpoints.pdf.	
	14	 STANLEY	ROTHMAN	ET	AL.,	THE	STILL	DIVIDED	ACADEMY:	HOW	COMPETING	VISIONS	OF	POWER,	POLITICS,	AND	
DIVERSITY	COMPLICATE	THE	MISSION	OF	HIGHER	EDUCATION	(2011).	
	15	 Brandenburg	v.	Ohio,	395	U.S.	444	(1969)	(per	curiam).	
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I.		METHODOLOGY	
Data	collection	 for	 this	 survey	was	overseen	by	 the	RAND	Survey	Re-
search	 Group	 (RAND	 SRG).16	 Prospective	 respondents	 who	 answered	 an	
email	 solicitation	were	screened	 for	eligibility17	before	 they	were	able	 to	
take	the	survey.	Information	was	collected	included	the	respondents’	gen-
der,	city	and	state	of	high	school	graduation,	city	and	state	of	college,	stand-
ing,	whether	the	respondent	identified	as	Hispanic/Latino,	and	type	of	col-
lege	 (public	 or	 private).	 Participants	 who	 successfully	 completed	 the	
screening	process	and	survey	were	given	a	modest	incentive	payment.	
The	survey	addressed	the	following	topics:18	
	
Question	
Number	 Issue	Explored	
1	 Views	on	whether	the	First	Amendment	confers	a	right	to	de-fame	
2	 Views	on	First	Amendment	protection	for	statements	of	preju-dice		
3,4	 The	First	Amendment	and	online	speech	
5,6	 Relevance	of	the	First	Amendment	in	the	21st	century	
7-10	 Acceptability	of	actions	to	prevent	speech	deemed	offensive	
11-12	 “True	threats”	and	objective	vs.	subjective	standards	
13	 Incitement	to	imminent	lawless	action	
14	 Views	on	whether	the	First	Amendment	requires	counterpoints	
15	 Views	on	whether	the	First	Amendment	protects	“hate	speech”	
16	 Whether	colleges	should	shield	students	from	offensive	speech	
17-18	 Political	affiliation	and	views	
	
Because	an	opt-in	online	method	was	used	to	solicit	participation,	the	
	
	16	 UCLA	retained	RAND	to	perform	the	data	collection.	RAND	SRG	programmed	the	online	interface	
to	be	used	by	respondents	for	data	collection	and	used	Opinion	Access	Corporation	to	solicit	par-
ticipation	in	the	survey.	
	17	 Prospective	respondents	were	only	eligible	to	complete	the	survey	if	they	reported	that	they	were	
currently	enrolled	undergraduate	 students	at	a	 four-year	U.S.	 college	or	university,	 if	 they	 re-
ported	that	they	were	eligible	to	vote	in	U.S.	elections,	and	if	they	reported	that	they	were	18	
years	of	age	or	older.	
	18	 The	survey	questionnaire	is	available	at:	luskin.ucla.edu/person/john-villasenor/survey.		
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resulting	sample	was	a	“non-probability	sample”19	as	opposed	to	a	“proba-
bility	sample.”20	(It	is	worth	noting	that	a	2016	Pew	Research	Center	report	
stated	that	“[w]hile	the	differences	between	probability	and	nonprobability	
samples	may	 be	 clear	 conceptually,	 the	 practical	 reality	 is	more	 compli-
cated.”)21	For	surveying	college	students,	online	opt-in	panels,	which	 is	a	
form	of	non-probability	sampling,	are	a	commonly	used	approach.	Among	
the	universe	of	all	possible	non-probability	samples,	there	is	a	large	poten-
tial	variation	in	how	closely,	or	not,	the	post-weighting	sample	statistically	
resembles	a	sample	that	would	have	been	obtained	through	the	purely	ran-
dom	selection	from	the	population	of	interest.	In	that	context,	it	is	worth	
noting	some	statistical	attributes	of	the	group	of	1500	respondents	to	this	
survey.		
Seventy-four	percent22	of	 the	 students	 sampled	 reported	attending	a	
public	institution,	and	thirty-six	percent	reported	attending	a	private	insti-
tution.23	By	comparison,	the	National	Center	for	Education	Statistics	(NCES)	
reports	that,	as	of	2015,	seventy-seven	percent	of	undergraduate	students	
attended	public	institutions	and	twenty-three	percent	attended	private	in-
stitutions	in	2015.24	Additionally,	eighteen	percent	of	the	students	sampled	
self-identified	as	Hispanic	or	Latino.25	The	2015	NCES	data	reports	the	same:	
	
	19	 See,	e.g.,	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	Non-Probability	Sampling,	
OECD	GLOSSARY	OF	STATISTICAL	TERMS	https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5066	 (last	up-
dated	Aug.	11,	2005)	(“[A	non-probability	sample	is	a]	sample	of	units	where	the	selected	units	in	
the	sample	have	an	unknown	probability	of	being	selected	and	where	some	units	of	the	target	
population	may	even	have	no	chance	at	all	of	being	in	the	sample.		Forms	of	non-probability	sam-
pling	are	numerous,	such	as	voluntary	samples	 (only	responses	of	volunteers	are	used),	quota	
samples,	expert	samples.”).	
	20	 See,	e.g.,	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	Probability	Sample,	OECD	
Glossary	 of	 Statistical	 Terms,	 https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2134	 (last	 updated	
Dec.	20,	2005)	(“A	probability	sample	is	a	sample	selected	by	a	method	based	on	the	theory	of	
probability	(random	process),	that	is,	by	a	method	involving	knowledge	of	the	likelihood	of	any	
unit	being	selected.”)	Although	the	foregoing	definition	allows	the	possibility	that	different	units	
may	have	different,	known	likelihoods	of	selection,	for	simplifying	the	discussion	in	this	paper	it	
will	be	assumed	 that	 “probability	 sample”	 refers	 to	a	 sample	 in	which	all	units	have	an	equal	
probability	of	selection.	
	21	 COURTNEY	KENNEDY,	ANDREW	MERCER,	SCOTT	KEETER,	NICK	HATLEY,	KYLEY	MCGEENEY	&	ALEJANDRA	GIMENEZ,	
EVALUATING	ONLINE	NONPROBABILITY	SURVEYS,	PEW	RESEARCH	CENTER	7	(2016).	
	22	 Throughout	this	Essay,	rounding	of	percentages	is	to	the	nearest	whole	number,	both	in	text	and	
in	tables.	As	a	result,	in	some	cases	percentages	will	not	sum	to	100.	
	23	 Villasenor,	supra	note	4.	
	24	 NAT’L	CTR	FOR	EDUC.	STATISTICS,	Total	Fall	Enrollment	in	Degree-granting	Postsecondary	Institutions,	
by	 Level	 of	 Enrollment,	 Sex	 of	 Student,	 and	 Other	 Selected	 Characteristics:	 2015,	 DIGEST	 OF	
EDUCATION	STATISTICS,	
		 https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.60.asp	(last	visited	Dec.	13,	2017).	It	
is	also	worth	noting	that	the	responses	to	the	Villasenor	2017	questions	were	generally	very	sim-
ilar	across	type	of	college	attended	(public	vs.	private),	meaning	that	even	if	there	was	a	diver-
gence	in	relation	to	public/private	percentages,	if	weighting	for	that	factor	had	been	performed	
it	would	have	had	minimal	impact.	
	25	 Villasenor,	supra	note	4.	
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eighteen	percent	of	undergraduate	students	self-identified	as	Hispanic	 in	
2015.26	 Sixty-nine	 percent	 of	 the	 students	 sampled	 self-identified	 as	 fe-
male.27	Women	do	indeed	outnumber	men	among	college	students,	though	
not	to	the	extent	reflected	in	this	sample.	To	account	for	this	difference,	the	
results	 presented	 here	 have	 been	weighted	 for	 gender	 to	 target	 a	 fifty-
seven	 percent/forty-three	 percent	male/female	 gender	 ratio.28	 Gender29	
was	the	only	factor	for	which	the	responses	in	this	survey	were	weighted.	
With	 respect	 to	 geographic	 distribution,	 respondents	 were	 from	 49	
states	and	the	District	of	Columbia.	The	U.S.	Census	Bureau	partitions	the	
country	into	four	census	regions,	termed	Northeast,	South,	Midwest,	and	
West.	The	Northeast	has	seventeen	percent	of	the	U.S	population30	and	was	
the	high	 school	 graduation	 location31	of	 twenty-one	percent	of	 respond-
ents;	the	South	has	thirty-eight	percent	of	the	US	population	and	was	the	
high	school	graduation	location	of	thirty-seven	percent	of	respondents;	the	
Midwest	has	 twenty-one	percent	of	 the	US	population	and	was	 the	high	
	
	26	 NAT’L	CTR	FOR	EDUC.	STATISTICS,	Total	Fall	Enrollment	in	Degree-granting	Postsecondary	Institutions,	
by	 Level	 of	 Enrollment,	 Sex,	Attendance	 Status,	 and	Race/Ethnicity	 of	 Student:	 Selected	 Years,	
1976	Through	2015,	DIGEST	OF	EDUCATION	STATISTICS,	https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/ta-
bles/dt16_306.10.asp	(last	visited	Dec.	13,	2017).		
	27	 Id.	
	28	 A	57%/43%	split	was	used	for	the	gender	weighting.	See,	e.g.,	NAT’L	CTR	FOR	EDUC.	STATISTICS,	Total	
Fall	Enrollment	in	Degree-granting	Postsecondary	Institutions,	by	Attendance	Status,	Sex	of	Stu-
dent,	 and	 Control	 of	 Institution:	 Selected	 Years,	 1947	 Through	 2026,	 DIGEST	 OF	 EDUCATION	
STATISTICS,	 https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.10.asp	 (last	 visited	 Dec.	
13,	2017)	(noting	a	57%/43%	female/male	postsecondary	student	split	as	of	2015	and	projecting	
a	58%/42%	split	in	2017);	see	also	NAT’L	CTR	FOR	EDUC.	STATISTICS,	Total	Undergraduate	Fall	Enroll-
ment	 in	Degree-granting	Postsecondary	 Institutions,	by	Attendance	Status,	Sex	of	Student,	and	
Control	and	Level	of	Institution:	Selected	Years,	1970	Through	2026,	DIGEST	OF	EDUCATION	STATISTICS,	
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.70.asp	 (last	 visited	 Dec.	 13,	 2017)	
(showing	a	56%/44%	female	undergraduate	split	as	of	2015).	
	29	 Gender	weighting	(for	non-gender-specific	categories)	was	performed	by	computing	percentages	
separately	for	women	and	men	and	then	using	a	linear	combination	of	gender-specific	percent-
ages,	with	the	coefficients	in	the	equation	set	in	accordance	with	the	female/male	split	among	
the	target	population.		
	30	 See	U.S.	CENSUS	BUREAU,	Census	Regions	and	Divisions	of	the	United	States,	U.S.	CENSUS	BUREAU,	
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf	 (last	visited	Dec.	
13,	2017)	(showing	how	the	U.S.	Census	Bureau	demarcates	different	sections	of	the	country);	
U.S.	 CENSUS	 BUREAU,	 United	 States	 Population	 Growth	 by	 Region,	 U.S.	 CENSUS	 BUREAU,	
https://www.census.gov/popclock/data_tables.php?component=growth	 (last	 visited	 Dec.	 13,	
2017)	(noting	the	growth	of	populations	in	each	region).	This	Essay	refers	to	the	U.S.	government	
estimates	of	the	July	1,	2016	population.		
	31	 U.S.	CENSUS	BUREAU,	United	States	Population	Growth	by	Region,	see	supra	note	30.	Given	the	im-
portance	of	political	socialization	in	the	context	of	the	family,	high	school	graduation	location	is	
arguably	more	likely	to	be	correlated	to	views	than	is	college	location.	See,	e.g.,	M.	Kent	Jennings,	
Laura	Stoker	&	Jake	Bowers,	Politics	Across	Generations:	Family	Transmission	Reexamined,	71	J.	
OF	POL.,	782,	787-90,	793-96	(2009)	(examining	how	political	views	in	the	family	affect	the	children	
in	 the	 family	 and	 noting	 that	 “the	 political	 views”	 of	 “1965	 high	 school	 graduates”	 probably	
stemmed	from	their	parents	and	that	the	graduates’	“own	children,	socialized	in	a	strikingly	dif-
ferent	social	and	political	era,	were	about	as	likely	as	they	were	to	follow	in	their	parents’	political,	
and	religious,	footsteps”).		
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school	graduation	location	of	twenty	percent	of	respondents,	and	the	West	
has	twenty-four	percent	of	the	US	population	and	was	the	high	school	grad-
uation	location	of	twenty-one	percent	of	respondents.		
With	regard	to	political	affiliation,	forty-six	percent	of	the	respondents	
self-identified	as	Democrats,	seventeen	percent	self-identified	as	Republi-
cans,	and	twenty-nine	percent	self-identified	as	Independents.	Seven	per-
cent	of	respondents	chose	the	“Don’t	know”	answer	option	when	asked	to	
state	their	political	affiliation.		
In	a	true	probability	sample	(one	involving	a	completely	random	selec-
tion	of	respondents	from	the	population	of	interest),	it	is	straightforward	to	
compute	the	margin	of	error	associated	with	a	given	confidence	level.	Even	
when	 there	 is	 a	non-probability	 sample,	 stating	 the	margin	of	 error	 that	
would	apply	in	the	case	of	a	probability	sample	of	equivalent	size,	accom-
panied	by	an	appropriate	caveat,	provides	more	information	than	staying	
silent	on	the	issue.	More	specifically,	it	provides	information	on	the	limiting	
case	of	what	would	occur	if	the	sample	were	truly	random—and	of	course	
the	more	the	actual	sample	deviates	from	true	randomness,	the	more	un-
certainty	arises	in	drawing	inferences	from	measurements	made	using	that	
sample.	With	the	above	caveats,	for	a	perfect	sample,	if	1500	respondents	
selected	from	a	much	larger	group	are	asked	a	question	to	which	about	half	
of	them	give	a	particular	answer,	the	margin	of	error	at	a	ninety-five	per-
cent	confidence	level	would	be	about	2.5%.32	For	a	group	with	250	respond-
ents	(which	is	similar	in	size	to	the	group	of	261	Republicans	who	partici-
pated	in	this	survey),	the	margin	of	error	at	this	confidence	level	would	be	
slightly	over	six	percent.33	
Data	collection	for	this	survey	took	place	between	August	17,	2017	and	
August	31,	2017.	A	few	days	prior	to	data	collection,	a	neo-Nazi	gathering	
led	to	violence	at	the	University	of	Virginia	in	Charlottesville,	VA.	This	event	
gathered	national	attention	and	was	a	major	topic	in	the	news	during	much	
of	the	time	during	which	data	was	collected	for	this	survey.	To	what	extent	
this	might	have	impacted	the	views	of	the	respondents	is	of	course	impos-
sible	to	know	since	there	is	not	an	equivalent	data	set	collected,	for	exam-
ple,	with	 the	 same	group	of	 respondents	 just	prior	 to	 the	Charlottesville	
events.	The	schedule	for	data	collection	was	set	several	months	in	advance,	
so	the	fact	that	it	occurred	in	the	days	and	weeks	immediately	following	the	
Charlottesville	events	was	a	coincidence.	While	it	could	be	argued	that	this	
	
	32	 This	2.5%	figure	assumes	a	question	in	which	50%	of	the	respondents	pick	a	particular	answer,	as	
50%	is	the	number	that	maximizes	the	margin	of	error.	For	questions	in	which	there	is	asymmetry	
in	the	answer,	the	margin	of	error	would	be	smaller.		
	33	 It	is	worth	noting	that	other	recent	non-probability	surveys	cited	herein	have	also	reported	mar-
gins	of	error.	See,	e.g.,	FIRE	2017,	supra	note	8,	at	7	(reporting	a	3.1%	margin	of	error);	McLaughlin	
2017,	supra	note	9,	at	2	(reporting	a	3.4%	“error	estimate”);	Economist/YouGov	2017,	supra	note	
10,	at	204	(reporting	a	3%	margin	of	error).		
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was	an	inappropriate	time	to	collect	data,	there	is	also	a	strong	argument	
that	that	the	opposite	is	true:	There	is	value	in	measuring	sentiment	on	key	
civil	liberties	after	critical	events,	as	history	shows	that	it	is	precisely	at	such	
times	that	civil	liberties	are	most	at	risk	of	being	abridged.34	
II.		INCITEMENTS	TO	IMMINENT	LAWLESS	ACTION;	DEFAMATION	
A.	Incitements	to	Imminent	Lawless	Action	
Under	the	1969	Brandenburg	v.	Ohio	decision,	speech	that	“is	directed	
to	 inciting	or	producing	 imminent	 lawless	action	and	 is	 likely	 to	 incite	or	
produce	such	action”35	is	outside	the	scope	of	First	Amendment	protection.	
The	Villasenor	2017	survey	explored	students’	attitudes	toward	incitement	
using	the	following	question:	
Q13:	A	protest	leader,	addressing	a	crowd	of	angry	protesters,	tells	protest-
ers	they	should	send	a	message	by	smashing	the	windows	of	nearby	store-
fronts.	 Should	 the	 protest	 leader’s	 statements	 be	 protected	 by	 the	 First	
Amendment?	
The	protest	leader’s	exhortation	runs	afoul	of	the	Brandenburg	stand-
ard,	as	 the	 instruction	 to	commit	vandalism	 is	 certainly	an	 incitement	 to	
imminent	lawless	action,	and	under	the	vignette	presented,	would	likely	re-
sult	in	such	action.	The	survey	responses	are	as	follows:	
TABLE	1:	INCITEMENTS	TO	IMMINENT	LAWLESS	ACTION	
SHOULD	THE	PROTEST	LEADER’S	STATEMENTS	BE	PROTECTED	BY	THE	FIRST	
AMENDMENT?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree36	 24%	 25%		 27%		 22%	 23%	 26%	 16%	 35%	
Disagree	 76%	 75%		 73%		 78%	 77%	 74%	 84%	 65%	
N	(unw.)37	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
	
	34	 See	Darren	W.	Davis	&	Brian	D.	Silver,	Civil	Liberties	vs.	Security:	Public	Opinion	in	the	Context	of	
the	Terrorist	Attacks	on	America,	48	AM.	J.	POL.	SCI.	28,	28	 (2004)	 (observing	 that	 “the	greater	
people’s	sense	of	threat,	the	lower	their	support	for	civil	liberties”).	
	35	 Brandenburg,	395	U.S.	at	447.	
	36	 In	this	question	and	in	all	other	questions	herein	in	which	respondents	were	asked	to	agree	or	
disagree,	respondents	had	a	choice	of	strongly	agree,	agree,	disagree,	and	strongly	disagree.	The	
“agree”	and	“disagree”	values	in	the	tables	present	the	sum	of	the	associated	tabs.	
	37	 In	this	and	all	subsequent	tables,	“N	(unw.)”	refers	to	unweighted	N.	
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Across	all	categories	except	gender,	there	is	no	sizable	variation	in	re-
sponses	to	this	question,	with	twenty-four	percent	of	respondents	stating,	
contrary	to	the	holding	in	Brandenburg,	that	the	exhortation	to	lawless	ac-
tion	should	be	protected	speech.	The	gender	difference	 in	the	responses	
among	the	respondents	is	notable,	with	men	more	than	twice	as	likely	as	
women	to	believe,	again	despite	the	contrary	holding	in	Brandenburg,	that	
the	speech	should	be	protected.	While	the	stereotype	is	that	college	stu-
dents	have	an	overly	narrow	view	of	the	First	Amendment,	the	table	above	
indicates	that	about	one	quarter	of	the	respondents	believe	that	the	First	
Amendment	should	confer	protection	on	 incitement	to	 imminent	 lawless	
action,	when	in	fact	under	Brandenburg	it	does	not.	
B.		Defamation	
Defamation	is	outside	the	scope	of	First	Amendment	protection.	As	the	
Supreme	Court	wrote	 in	relation	to	public	officials	 in	 its	1964	decision	 in	
New	York	Times	Co.	v.	Sullivan,	the	“constitutional	guarantees	[of	the	First	
and	Fourteenth	Amendments]	require,	we	think,	a	federal	rule	that	prohib-
its	a	public	official	from	recovering	damages	for	a	defamatory	falsehood	re-
lating	to	his	official	conduct	unless	he	proves	that	the	statement	was	made	
with	‘actual	malice’—that	is,	with	knowledge	that	it	was	false	or	with	reck-
less	disregard	of	whether	it	was	false	or	not.”38	The	actual	malice	standard	
originally	applied	to	public	officials	was	later	broadened	to	include	public	
figures	as	well.39	By	contrast,	for	private	figures	the	standard	to	show	defa-
mation	is	negligence.40		
With	that	as	context,	Villasenor	2017	included	the	following	two	ques-
tions	to	explore	attitudes	towards	defamation.	Half	of	the	respondents	an-
swered	 the	Question	 1A,	 and	 another	 half-answered	Question	 1B.41	 The	
questions	are	similar	 in	 that	 they	 involve	a	 restaurant	diner	subjected	to	
rude	service	and	who	then	attempts	to	punish	the	restaurant	by	publishing	
a	false	claim	of	food	poisoning	on	social	media.	The	difference	between	the	
two	vignettes	is	in	the	level	of	rudeness	experienced	by	the	diner:	
	
	38	 376	U.S.	254,	279-80	(1964).		
	39	 See	Gertz	v.	Robert	Welch,	Inc.,	418	U.S.	323,	345	(1974)	with	respect	to	public	figures:	“Some	
occupy	positions	of	such	persuasive	power	and	influence	that	they	are	deemed	public	figures	for	
all	purposes.	More	commonly,	those	classed	as	public	figures	have	thrust	themselves	to	the	fore-
front	of	particular	public	controversies	in	order	to	influence	the	resolution	of	the	issues	involved.	
In	either	event,	they	invite	attention	and	comment.”.	
	40	 See,	e.g.,	RESTATEMENT	(SECOND)	OF	TORTS	§	558	(AM.	LAW	INST.	1976):	To	create	liability	for	defama-
tion	there	must	be:	(a)	a	false	and	defamatory	statement	concerning	another;	(b)	an	unprivileged	
publication	to	a	third	party;	(c)	fault	amounting	at	least	to	negligence	on	the	part	of	the	publisher	
[with	respect	to	the	act	of	publication];	and	(d)	either	actionability	of	the	statement	irrespective	
of	special	harm	or	the	existence	of	special	harm	caused	by	the	publication.”	(emphasis	added).	
	41	 More	specifically,	749	of	the	1500	respondents	answered	Question	1A,	and	751	of	the	respond-
ents	answered	Question	1B.	
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Question	1A:	A	man	goes	to	a	restaurant	and	the	owner	of	the	restaurant	
is	rude	(but	not	extremely	rude)	to	him.	The	man	is	angry	about	the	rude	
service	and	so	he	posts	a	review	on	Yelp	falsely	saying	that	he	got	food	poi-
soning	from	eating	at	the	restaurant.	To	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	disa-
gree	with	the	following	statement:	“The	man’s	posting	of	the	Yelp	review	
should	be	protected	by	the	First	Amendment.”	
Question	1B:	A	man	goes	to	a	restaurant	and	the	owner	of	the	restaurant	
is	extremely	rude	to	him.	Among	other	things,	the	owner	makes	highly	of-
fensive	and	insulting	statements	to	the	man.	The	man	is	angry	about	the	
rude	service	and	so	he	posts	a	review	on	Yelp	falsely	saying	that	he	got	food	
poisoning	from	eating	at	the	restaurant.	To	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	
disagree	with	the	following	statement:	“The	man’s	posting	of	the	Yelp	re-
view	should	be	protected	by	the	First	Amendment.”	
In	both	of	the	above	vignettes,	the	publication	of	the	false	Yelp	review	
constitutes	defamation.	Whether	the	restaurant	owner	is	a	private	individ-
ual	or	a	limited	purpose	public	figure	is	irrelevant,	as	the	diner’s	publication	
was	published	with	knowledge	that	it	was	false,	thus	meeting	the	require-
ment	 for	 a	 defamation	 claim	 even	 under	 the	 actual	malice	 standard.	 In	
short,	 the	First	Amendment	does	not	protect	the	publication	of	the	false	
review	contemplated	in	these	vignettes.	
In	constructing	this	set	of	questions,	the	goal	was	twofold.	First,	it	is	of	
interest	to	know	what	how	what	fraction	of	respondents	believe	that	the	
First	Amendment	should	give	them	license	to	engage	in	defamation	in	re-
sponse	to	being	treated	rudely.	Second,	 it	 is	of	 interest	to	know	whether	
the	severity	of	the	rude	treatment	leads	to	different	answers	regarding	the	
respondents’	views	on	their	right	to	publish	a	defamatory	statement.	The	
answers	were	as	follows	(where	“agree”	corresponds	a	belief	that	the	de-
famatory	review	should	be	protected,	and	“disagree”	corresponds	to	a	be-
lief	that	it	is	not	protected).	
TABLE	2A:	DEFAMATION	IN	RESPONSE	TO	RUDE	SERVICE	
VIEWS	ON	THE	STATEMENT:	“THE	MAN’S	POSTING	OF	THE	YELP	REVIEW	SHOULD	BE	
PROTECTED	BY	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT.”	
IF	THE	DINER	RECEIVES	RUDE,	BUT	NOT	EXTREMELY	RUDE	SERVICE	(Q1A):	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 44%	 43%	 51%	 42%	 43%	 45%	 39%	 50%	
Disagree	 56%	 57%	 49%	 58%	 57%	 55%	 61%	 50%	
N	(unw.)	 749	 354	 130	 206	 545	 204	 538	 211	
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TABLE	2B:	DEFAMATION	IN	RESPONSE	TO	RUDE	EXTREMELY	SERVICE	
VIEWS	ON	THE	STATEMENT:	“THE	MAN’S	POSTING	OF	THE	YELP	REVIEW	SHOULD	BE	
PROTECTED	BY	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT.”	
IF	THE	DINER	RECEIVES	EXTREMELY	RUDE	SERVICE	(Q1B):	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 45%	 44%	 53%	 42%	 44%	 45%	 41%	 50%		
Disagree	 55%	 56%	 47%	 58%	 56%	 55%	 59%	 50%		
N	(unw.)	 751	 343	 131	 225	 571	 180	 502	 249	
	
When	comparing	tabulations	between	questions	1A	and	1B,	the	results	
suggest	 that	 students	 have	 very	 similar	 attitudes	 toward	 defamation	 re-
gardless	of	whether	the	diner	receives	rude	or	extremely	rude	service.	In	
other	words,	across	 the	different	 subcategories	 in	Tables	2A	and	2B,	 the	
degree	to	which	the	diner	in	this	vignette	is	the	victim	of	rude	service	has	
no	notable	impact	on	the	responses.		
More	 interestingly,	 in	both	 tables,	 just	under	half	of	 the	 respondents	
believe	that	the	First	Amendment	should	protect	defamatory	statements	
made	in	response	to	rude	treatment.	There	are	at	least	two	possible	expla-
nations	for	this.	First,	it	is	possible	that	these	respondents	believe	that	def-
amation	in	general	is	(or	should	be)	protected	speech.	In	other	words,	they	
may	believe	that	the	First	Amendment	confers	a	right	to	engage	in	defama-
tion	for	any	reason	or	even	for	no	reason	at	all.	Second,	it	is	possible	that	
these	respondents	believe	that	defamation	is	(or	should	be)	constitutionally	
protected	when	it	occurs	specifically	in	response	to	having	been	wronged.	
While	it	is	impossible	given	the	survey	data	to	disentangle	the	two	possible	
explanations,	 the	 broader	 message	 is	 clear:	 A	 very	 substantial	 fraction	
(forty-four	percent	in	Table	1A;	forty-five	percent	in	Table	1B)	of	respond-
ents	believe	that	constitutional	guarantees	of	freedom	of	expression	should	
include	the	right	to	engage	in	defamation.	Thus,	this	is	an	example	of	an-
other	exception	to	the	common	stereotype	that	college	students	have	an	
overly	narrow	conception	of	the	First	Amendment:	In	the	case	of	defama-
tion,	 at	 least	with	 respect	 to	 the	 pair	 of	 vignettes	 that	were	 presented,	
many	students	have	an	overly	broad	view	of	the	scope	of	protected	expres-
sion.	
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III.	ONLINE	SPEECH	
A.	Level	of	Protection	Given	to	Online	Speech	
One	of	the	most	interesting	and	important	areas	of	free	expression	in-
quiry	 relates	 to	 online	 speech.	 In	 1997,	 only	 a	 few	 years	 after	 internet	
browsers	had	begun	experiencing	wide	adoption,	the	Supreme	Court	con-
sidered	the	anti-indecency	provisions	of	the	Communications	Decency	Act	
(CDA)	of	1996.	In	finding	those	provisions	to	be	unconstitutional,	the	Court	
concluded	 that	 “[i]n	 order	 to	 deny	minors	 access	 to	 potentially	 harmful	
speech,	the	CDA	effectively	suppresses	a	large	amount	of	speech	that	adults	
have	a	constitutional	right	to	receive	and	to	address	to	one	another.”42	The	
Court	also	addressed	the	broader	issue	of	freedom	of	expression	on	the	in-
ternet,	writing	 that	 “‘the	content	on	 the	 Internet	 is	as	diverse	as	human	
thought.’	We	agree	with	[the	district	court’s]	conclusion	that	our	cases	pro-
vide	 no	 basis	 for	 qualifying	 the	 level	 of	 First	 Amendment	 scrutiny	 that	
should	be	applied	to	this	medium.”43	To	explore	this	issue	two	decades	after	
the	Reno	decision,	Villasenor	2017	asked	students	to	respond	to	the	follow-
ing	questions:	
Q3:	Statements	made	on	social	networking	services	such	as	Facebook	and	
Instagram	are	examples	of	online	speech.	By	contrast,	in-person	statements	
made	by	a	speaker	to	a	listener	who	is	in	the	same	room	as	the	speaker	are	
examples	of	face-to-face	speech.	Which	of	the	following	three	statements	
do	you	agree	with	most?	
(1)	Online	speech	should	have	less	protection	under	the	First	Amendment	
than	face-to-face	speech.	
(2)	Online	speech	should	have	the	same	level	of	protection	under	the	First	
Amendment	as	face-to-face	speech.	
(3)	Online	speech	should	have	more	protection	under	the	First	Amendment	
than	face-to-face	speech.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	42	 Reno	v.	American	Civil	Liberties	Union,	521	U.S.	844,	874	(1997).	
	43	 Id.	at	870	(quoting	Reno	v.	American	Civil	Liberties	Union,	929	F.	Supp.	824,	842	(E.D.	Pa.	1996)).	
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TABLE	3:	LEVEL	OF	PROTECTION	OF	ONLINE	SPEECH	SHOULD	RECEIVE	RELATIVE	TO	FACE-
TO-FACE	SPEECH	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
Level	of	pro-
tection	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public		 Private	 Female	 Male	
Less	 (option	
1)	 15%	 15%	 18%	 13%	 16%	 13%	 14%	 18%	
Same	 (op-
tion	2)	 76%	 75%	 70%	 80%	 76%	 75%	 81%	 69%	
More	 (op-
tion	3)	 		9%	 10%	 13%	 		7%	 		8%	 13%	 	6%	 14%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
As	Table	3	shows,	the	majority	of	respondents	hold	views	aligned	with	
the	Court’s	conclusion	in	Reno	v.	ACLU	that	the	First	Amendment	should	be	
applied	 equally	 broadly	 in	 online	 and	offline	 contexts.	 For	 example,	 sev-
enty-six	percent	of	 respondents	overall	 stated	 that	online	 speech	 should	
receive	the	same	level	of	protection	as	face-to-face	speech,	and	among	the	
subcategories	 the	percentages	 ranged	 from	 sixty-nine	percent	 to	 eighty-
one	percent.	This	 is	an	encouraging	result,	but	as	 the	question	discussed	
below	illustrates,	things	become	more	complex	when	anonymity	is	explic-
itly	considered	as	part	of	the	question.	
B.	Level	of	Protection	Given	to	Speech	that	Is	Both	Online	and	Anonymous	
Another	important	area	of	inquiry	is	anonymous	online	speech.	In	1995,	
in	 relation	 to	 paper	 (as	 opposed	 to	 online)	 publication,	 the	 Court	 struck	
down	as	unconstitutional	an	Ohio	law	prohibiting	anonymous	campaign	lit-
erature,	writing	in	its	ruling	in	McIntyre	v.	Ohio	Elections	Commission	that	
“[u]nder	our	Constitution,	anonymous	pamphleteering	is	not	a	pernicious,	
fraudulent	practice,	but	an	honorable	tradition	of	advocacy	and	of	dissent.	
Anonymity	is	a	shield	from	the	tyranny	of	the	majority.”44	
The	Supreme	Court	has	never	ruled	on	the	specific	question	of	constitu-
tional	limits	in	relation	to	speech	that	is	both	anonymous	and	online.	How-
ever,	the	combination	of	the	1995	McIntyre	v.	Ohio	Elections	Comm’n	rul-
ing,	 which	 affirmed	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 anonymous	 speech,	 and	 the	
1997	Reno	decision,	which	confirmed	that	 the	scope	of	 the	First	Amend-
ment	is	as	broad	online	as	it	is	in	other	contexts,	makes	it	plausible	to	con-
	
	44	 McIntyre	v.	Ohio	Elections	Comm’n,	514	U.S.	334,	357	(1995).	
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clude	that	anonymous	online	speech	should	receive	the	same	level	of	pro-
tection	as	 speech	 in	any	other	context—e.g.,	whether	online	or	not,	and	
whether	anonymous	or	not.	The	responses	to	the	following	question,	how-
ever,	 indicate	 that	 many	 respondents	 believe	 that	 anonymous,	 online	
speech	deserves	less	protection:	
Q4:	Some	social	media	apps	are	designed	specifically	to	enable	people	to	
publish	posts	anonymously,	 so	 that	 their	 identity	 is	not	published.	Some-
times	people	post	insulting	statements	using	social	media	apps	that	provide	
anonymity.	How	much	protection	should	insulting,	anonymous	social	media	
posts	be	given	under	the	First	Amendment?	
	(1)	Online	statements	that	are	both	anonymous	and	insulting	should	not	
be	protected	under	the	First	Amendment.	
(2)	Online	statements	that	are	both	anonymous	and	insulting	should	have	
some	 protection	 under	 the	 First	 Amendment,	 but	 less	 protection	 than	 if	
those	same	insulting	statements	are	made	online	by	a	speaker	who	does	
not	hide	his	or	her	identity.	
(3)	Online	statements	that	are	both	anonymous	and	insulting	should	have	
the	same	level	of	protection	under	the	First	Amendment	as	insulting	state-
ments	made	online	by	a	speaker	who	does	not	hide	his	or	her	identity.	
	
	 The	answers	are	as	follows:		
TABLE	4:	PROTECTION	FOR	ANONYMOUS	ONLINE	SPEECH	RELATIVE	TO	PROTECTION	
GIVEN	ONLINE	NON-ANONYMOUS	SPEECH	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
Level	of	pro-
tection	 Total	 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public		 Private	 Female	 Male	
None	
(option	1)	 27%	 28%	 29%	 25%	 27%	 29%	 30%	 24%	
Less	
(option	2)	 37%	 39%	 35%	 37%	 39%	 29%	 35%	 40%	
Same	
(option	3)	 36%	 34%	 36%	 38%	 34%	 41%	 36%	 36%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
Thirty-six	percent	of	the	students	surveyed	expressed	a	belief	that	in-
sulting	speech	conveyed	both	anonymously	and	online	deserves	equal	pro-
tection	 to	 similar	 statements	 made	 online	 but	 without	 masking	 the	
speaker’s	identity.	Twenty-seven	percent	of	respondents	stated	that	online	
statements	that	are	both	anonymous	and	insulting	should	not	be	protected	
under	the	First	Amendment,	while	thirty-seven	percent	of	respondents	an-
swered	that	there	should	be	less	(but	still	some)	protection.	This	suggests	a	
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sizable	divergence	from	what	is	implied	by	the	combination	of	the	Supreme	
Court	decisions	in	McIntyre	v.	Ohio	Elections	Commission	and	Reno.	In	other	
words,	if	under	McIntyre	v.	Ohio	Elections	Commission	anonymous	speech	
is	 viewed	 as	 receiving	 the	 same	 level	 of	 protection	 as	 non-anonymous	
speech,	and	under	Reno	online	speech	is	viewed	as	receiving	the	same	level	
of	protection	as	offline	speech,	then	a	plausible	conclusion	in	light	of	those	
two	rulings	is	that	speech	that	is	both	anonymous	and	online	should	be	sim-
ilarly	protected.	However,	nearly	two-thirds	of	respondents	appear	to	hold	
the	 view	 that	 online	 anonymous	 speech	 (at	 least	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	
speech	is	 insulting)	should	not	receive	as	much	protection	as	online	non-
anonymous	speech.45		
IV.	“TRUE	THREATS”	AND	OBJECTIVE	VS.	SUBJECTIVE	STANDARDS	
	“True	threats”	fall	outside	the	scope	of	First	Amendment	protection.46	
The	 Court	 originally	 identified	 “true	 threats”	 as	 unprotected	 in	 its	 1969	
Watts	v	United	States	decision,	but	provided	no	real	guidance	on	what	con-
stitutes	a	“true	threat.”47	Over	three	decades	 later	 in	 its	Virginia	v.	Black	
ruling	 in	2003,	the	Court	provided	a	more	substantive	discussion	of	what	
constitutes	a	“true	threat,”	writing:	
True	 threats	 encompass	 those	 statements	where	 the	 speaker	means	 to	
communicate	a	serious	expression	of	an	intent	to	commit	an	act	of	unlaw-
ful	 violence	 to	 a	 particular	 individual	 or	 group	 of	 individuals	 .	 .	 .	 .	 The	
speaker	need	not	actually	intend	to	carry	out	the	threat.	Rather,	a	prohibi-
tion	on	 true	 threats	 protect[s]	 individuals	 from	 the	 fear	 of	 violence	 and	
from	the	disruption	that	fear	engenders,	in	addition	to	protecting	people	
from	the	possibility	that	the	threatened	violence	will	occur.	Intimidation	in	
the	constitutionally	prescriptible	sense	of	the	word	is	a	type	of	true	threat,	
where	a	speaker	directs	a	threat	to	a	person	or	group	of	persons	with	the	
intent	of	placing	the	victim	in	fear	of	bodily	harm	or	death.48	
The	above	explanation	did	little	to	resolve	one	of	the	most	important	
questions	relating	to	“true	threats:”	whether	they	should	be	evaluated	us-
ing	a	subjective	or	objective	standard.49	Under	a	subjective	standard,	it	 is	
	
	45	 Adding	 the	 twenty-seven	percent	of	 respondents	who	stated	 that	 insulting	online	anonymous	
statements	should	not	be	constitutionally	protected	to	the	thirty-seven	percent	of	respondents	
who	answered	that	there	should	be	less	(but	still	some)	protection	gives	a	total	of	sixty-four	per-
cent;	i.e.,	just	under	two-thirds.	
	46	 See	Watts	v.	United	States,	394	U.S.	705,	708	(1969).	
	47	 Id.		
	48	 Virginia	v.	Black,	538	U.S.	343,	359–60	(2003)	(internal	quotation	marks	and	citations	omitted).	
	49	 See	generally	Paul	T.	Crane,	“True	Threats”	and	the	 Issue	of	 Intent,	92	VA.	L.	REV.	1225	(2006),	
(explaining	the	differences	between	subjective	and	objective	standards	and	how	those	standards	
have	been	applied	in	the	courts	through	the	mid-2000s).	For	another	detailed	discussion	of	these	
standards,	published	prior	to	the	2003	Virginia	v.	Black	ruling,	see	generally	Jennifer	E.	Rothman,	
Freedom	of	Speech	and	True	Threats,	25	HARV.	J.L.	&	PUB.	POL’Y	283	(2001).	This	issue	is	also	dis-
cussed,	including	after	the	Elonis	ruling,	in	John	Villasenor,	Technology	and	the	Role	of	Intent	in	
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necessary	to	get	inside	the	mind	of	the	speaker	and	assess	intent.	By	con-
trast,	under	an	objective	standard	the	speaker’s	 intent	 is	not	considered;	
what	matters	is	whether	a	reasonable	person	would	understand	a	threat	to	
convey	an	intent	to	inflict	bodily	harm.	Of	course,	it	is	also	possible	to	sim-
ultaneously	consider	both	standards.	
Readers	 of	 the	 Virginia	 v.	 Black	 ruling	 who	 focus	 on	 the	 phrases	
“speaker	means	to	communicate	a	serious	expression	of	an	intent	to	com-
mit”	 violence	 and	 “intent	 of	 placing	 the	 victim	 in	 fear	 of	 bodily	 harm	or	
death”	find	support	for	a	subjective	standard.	Readers	who	instead	focus	
on	 the	 phrase	 “[t]rue	 threats	 encompass	 those	 statements”	 (emphasis	
added)	can	find	support	for	an	interpretation	that	“encompass”	means	that	
“true	 threats”	 can	 also	 include	 statements	 evaluated	 without	 regard	 to	
speaker	intent.	The	years	following	Virginia	v.	Black	saw	lower	courts	issue	
rulings	in	cases	involving	threat	statutes	using	both	standards.50		
In	2014,	the	issue	came	before	the	Supreme	Court	again	when	it	granted	
certiorari	 in	Elonis	v.	United	States,51	with	one	of	the	two	“questions	pre-
sented”	asking:	“Whether,	[consistent	with	the	First	Amendment	and	Vir-
ginia	v.	Black,	538	U.S.	343	(2003)],	conviction	of	threatening	another	per-
son	 requires	 proof	 of	 the	 defendant’s	 subjective	 intent	 to	 threaten”	 or	
whether	it	is	enough	to	show	that	a	“reasonable	person”	would	regard	the	
statement	as	threatening.52	
However,	 when	 the	 Court	 issued	 its	 Elonis	 decision	 in	 2015,53	 it	 ad-
dressed	(and	answered	in	the	affirmative54)	only	the	other	“question	pre-
sented,”	which	concerned	whether	conviction	under	the	statute	at	 issue,	
18	U.S.C.	§	875(c),	requires	consideration	of	intent.	The	Court	did	not	reach	
the	more	 fundamental	 question	 of	 what	 the	 First	 Amendment	 itself	 re-
quires.	Therefore,	while	 it	 is	clear	 that	“true	threats”	are	outside	of	First	
Amendment	protection,	post-Elonis	 the	 issue	of	what	 constraints,	 if	 any,	
the	First	Amendment	itself	might	place	on	the	application	of	criminal	threat	
statutes	with	 respect	 to	 the	subjective-objective	 issue	has	not	been	 fully	
resolved.	That	said,	Court’s	decision	in	Elonis	to	require	a	subjective	stand-
ard	when	interpreting	18	U.S.C.	§	875(c)	could	be	read,	at	least	indirectly,	
	
Constitutionally	Protected	Expression,	39	HARV.	J.L.	&	PUB.	POL’Y	631	(2016).	
	50	 Compare	United	States	v.	Bagdasarian,	652	F.3d	1113	(9th	Cir.	2011)	(using	a	subjective	standard);	
United	States	v.	Magleby,	420	F.3d	1136	(10th	Cir.	2005)	(using	a	subjective	standard)	with	United	
States	v.	White,	670	F.3d	498	(4th	Cir.	2012)	(using	an	objective	standard);	United	States	v.	Jef-
fries,	692	F.3d	473	(6th	Cir.	2012)	(using	an	objective	standard);	United	States	v.	Stewart,	411	F.3d	
825,	828	(7th	Cir.	2005)	(using	an	objective	standard);	United	States	v.	Mabie,	663	F.3d	322,	330	
(8th	Cir.	2011)	(using	an	objective	standard).	
	51	 134	S.	Ct.	2819	(2014)	(granting	certiorari).	
	52	 Id.	
	53	 Elonis	v.	United	States,	135	S.Ct.	2011	(2015).	
	54	 Id.	at	2011	(holding	that	that	for	conviction	under	18	U.S.C.	§	875(c),	what	the	defendant	thinks	
“does	matter.”).		
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as	consistent	with	an	approach	in	which	interpretation	of	18	U.S.C.	§	875(c)	
without	reference	to	intent	could	run	afoul	of	the	First	Amendment.	More	
broadly,	the	fact	that	the	Court	imposed	an	intent	requirement	in	18	U.S.C.	
§875(c)	despite	the	lack	of	text	in	the	statute	specifically	identifying	such	a	
requirement	could	be	viewed	to	imply	that	the	Court	would	take	the	posi-
tion	that	any	threat	statute	must	be	 interpreted	has	having	an	 intent	re-
quirement,	even	such	a	requirement	is	not	explicitly	present	in	the	text	of	
the	statute.	Stated	another	way,	there	is	at	least	a	suggestion	that	identify-
ing	a	“true	 threat”	 in	a	manner	compliant	with	 the	First	Amendment	 re-
quires	utilizing	a	subjective	standard.55	With	the	foregoing	as	context,	here	
is	the	question	that	was	asked	in	the	Villasenor	2017	survey:	
Q12:	Consider	a	hostile	statement	made	by	a	speaker	to	a	listener.	In	deter-
mining	whether	 the	 statement	 should	 be	 protected	 by	 the	 First	 Amend-
ment,	which	of	the	following	do	you	agree	with	most:	(respondents	were	
required	to	pick	exactly	one)	
(1)	The	words	of	the	statement	alone	are	enough	to	determine	whether	the	
speech	is	protected	under	the	First	Amendment.	It	doesn’t	matter	what	the	
speaker	thinks,	or	what	the	listener	perceives.	
(2)	To	determine	whether	the	statement	is	protected	under	the	First	Amend-
ment,	the	only	things	that	matter	are	the	words	of	the	statement	and	how	
the	listener	perceives	the	statement.	
(3)	To	determine	whether	the	statement	is	protected	under	the	First	Amend-
ment,	the	only	things	that	matter	are	the	words	of	the	statement	and	how	
the	speaker	intends	for	the	statement	to	be	perceived.	
(4)	To	determine	whether	the	statement	is	protected	under	the	First	Amend-
ment,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	the	words	of	the	statement,	the	intent	of	
the	speaker	and	how	the	listener	perceives	the	statement.	
TABLE	5:	“TRUE	THREATS”	AND	SUBJECTIVE	OR	OBJECTIVE	STANDARDS	
(REFER	TO	DESCRIPTION	ABOVE	FOR	CORRESPONDENCE	BETWEEN	THE	OPTIONS	
PRESENTED	ABOVE	AND	THE	NUMBERS	IN	THE	LEFT	COLUMN	IN	THE	TABLE)	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
Option	 Total	 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public		 Private	 Female	 Male	
1	 23%	 19%	 32%	 24%	 23%	 24%	 24%	 22%	
2	 22%	 26%	 21%	 19%	 22%	 21%	 15%	 31%	
3	 16%	 17%	 17%	 16%	 16%	 15%	 15%	 17%	
4	 39%	 38%	 30%	 41%	 39%	 40%	 46%	 30%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
	55	 Although,	not	necessarily	only	a	subjective	standard;	it	is	also	possible	to	require	the	use	of	both	
a	subjective	and	objective	standard.	
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None	of	the	options	in	Table	5	were	selected	by	a	majority	of	respond-
ents.	 This	 is	 unsurprising,	 given	 that	 federal	 appeals	 courts	 have	 also	
reached	 divergent	 conclusions	 on	 the	 subjective/objective	 issue.	 Thirty-
nine	percent	of	respondents	chose	option	4,	which	involves	use	of	both	ob-
jective	and	subjective	criteria.	Option	3	(the	purely	subjective	approach)	re-
ceived	the	least	amount	of	support.	This	is	notable	because	option	3	is	con-
sistent	with56	the	Supreme	Court	ruling	in	Elonis,	though	it	is	important	to	
note	again	that	the	Elonis	Court	addressed	only	the	statute	at	issue,	and	not	
the	broader	question	of	what	the	First	Amendment	requires.	
In	addition	to	directly	asking	a	question	regarding	objective	and	subjec-
tive	standards,	Villasenor	2017	 included	two	different	vignettes	 involving	
the	same	threat,	but	differing	in	that	the	intent	behind	the	threat	was	dif-
ferent.	Thus,	this	question	was	intended	to	explore	whether	respondents	
considered	the	state	of	mind	of	the	person	presenting	the	threat	to	be	im-
portant.	Half	of	respondents	answered	Q11A,	and	half	of	respondents	an-
swered	Q11B:57	
Q11A:	Tom	and	Phil	live	on	the	same	street	and	strongly	dislike	each	other.	
While	Tom	 is	away	 from	home	and	 traveling	 in	another	 state,	Phil	posts	
something	about	Tom	on	Twitter	that	enrages	Tom.	While	Tom	does	not	
intend	to	actually	physically	attack	Phil,	Tom	wants	scare	Phil	by	making	
him	believe	that	an	attack	is	forthcoming.	He	sends	Phil	a	private	message	
on	Twitter,	saying	“When	I	get	back	I	am	going	to	punch	you	so	hard	you	
won’t	 even	 know	what	 hit	 you.”	Do	 you	agree	 that	 Tom’s	 threat	 to	 Phil	
should	be	protected	by	the	First	Amendment?	
	
Q11B:	Tom	and	Phil	live	on	the	same	street	and	know	each	other,	but	not	
particularly	well.	While	Tom	is	away	from	home	and	traveling	 in	another	
state,	Phil	posts	something	about	Tom	on	Twitter	that	annoys	Tom.	In	re-
sponse	Tom	sends	Phil	a	private	message,	saying	“When	 I	get	back	 I	am	
going	to	punch	you	so	hard	you	won’t	even	know	what	hit	you.”	When	send-
ing	this	message,	Tom	assumes	that	Phil	will	know	that	Tom	is	venting	and	
that	Tom	does	not	actually	 intend	to	physically	attack	Phil.	Do	you	agree	
that	Tom’s	threat	to	Phil	should	be	protected	by	the	First	Amendment?	
	
	
	
	
	
	56	 That	option	is	“consistent	with”	Elonis	because	while	the	Court	wrote	that	what	Elonis	thinks	does	
matter,	the	Court	did	not	write	that	what	the	recipient	of	the	threat	thinks	does	not	matter.	Thus,	
another	potential	reading	of	Elonis,	placed	into	the	context	of	the	options	explored	in	question	
Q12	and	tabulated	in	Table	5	above,	is	that	the	Court	rejected	options	1	and	2,	but	took	a	position	
that	could	be	read	to	support	either	option	3	or	option	4.		
	57	 More	specifically,	751	of	the	respondents	answered	question	Q11A	and	749	of	respondents	an-
swered	question	Q11B.	
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TABLE	6A:	LEVEL	OF	PROTECTION	WHEN	SPEAKER	HAS	AN	INTENT	TO	THREATEN	
Q11A:	IF	TOM	INTENDS	FOR	PHIL	TO	BELIEVE	AN	ATTACK	IS	FORTHCOMING,	SHOULD	
TOM’S	THREAT	TO	PHIL	SHOULD	BE	PROTECTED	BY	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total	 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 36%		 35%		 46%	 34%	 35%	 40%		 27%	 49%	
Disagree	 64%		 65%		 54%	 66%	 65%	 60%	 73%	 51%	
N	(unw.)	 751	 347	 131	 218	 555	 196	 520	 231	
	
TABLE	6B:	LEVEL	OF	PROTECTION	WHEN	SPEAKER	DOES	NOT	HAVE	AN	INTENT	TO	
THREATEN	
Q11B:	IF	TOM	BELIEVES	THAT	PHIL	WILL	KNOW	NO	REAL	ATTACK	IS	FORTHCOMING,	
SHOULD	TOM’S	THREAT	TO	PHIL	SHOULD	BE	PROTECTED	BY	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 41%	 40%	 43%		 43%	 41%		 41%	 34%	 51%	
Disagree	 59%	 60%	 57%		 57%	 59%		 59%	 66%	 49%	
N	(unw.)	 749	 350	 130	 213	 561	 188	 520	 229	
	
For	most	categories,	the	above	answers	show	lack	of	a	sizable	numerical	
difference	 when	 comparing	 across	 the	 two	 tables.	 This	 suggests	 that,	
among	the	pool	of	respondents,	there	was	little	differentiation	between	the	
two	types	of	intent	conveyed	in	question	Q11A	and	Q11B.	This	is	also	con-
sistent	with	the	observations	from	the	responses	to	the	prior	question,	in	
which	different	treatments	of	intent	did	not	lead	to	dramatically	different	
answers.	 Again,	 this	 is	 not	 surprising	 given	 that	 lower	 courts	 have	 also	
reached	divergent	conclusions	on	this	issue.	This	has	important	implications	
for	 trials	 involving	 criminal	 threat	 statutes,	 suggesting,	 for	 example,	 that	
jury	instructions	need	to	be	particularly	clear	about	what	standard	is	to	be	
applied,	and	 that	 in	 the	absence	of	 that	 clarity,	 jurors	are	 likely	 to	apply	
different	standards.	
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V.		OTHER	QUESTIONS	RELATED	TO	OFFENSIVE	SPEECH	
A.	Shutting	Down	Speech	Deemed	Offensive	
One	 of	 the	 recurring	 stories	 on	 college	 campuses	 involves	 student	
groups	preventing	 expression	by	 speakers	 they	deem	offensive.	 In	 some	
cases,	this	involves	pressuring	the	event	hosts	or	university	administrators	
to	“disinvite”	a	previously	 invited	speaker.	 In	other	cases,	 shutting	down	
speech	involves	heckling	a	speaker	so	that	he	or	she	cannot	be	heard	by	the	
audience.	On	occasion	students	have	resorted	to	physically	blocking	access	
to	the	event	venue	or	committing	acts	of	vandalism	or	violence	to	prevent	
a	speech.	To	explore	students’	views	toward	these	sorts	of	actions,	The	Vil-
lasenor	2017	survey	asked	students	to	respond	to	the	following	vignette,	
which	was	used	in	identical	form	in	four	questions:	
A	 public	 university	 invites	 a	 very	 controversial	 speaker	 to	 an	 on-campus	
event.	The	speaker	is	known	for	making	offensive	and	hurtful	statements.	
Using	this	framing,	the	Villasenor	2017	survey	presented	a	set	of	four	
questions,	each	of	which	pertained	to	a	specific	action	aimed	at	preventing	
the	speaker	from	delivering	the	speech:	
TABLE	7:	SILENCING	SPEECH	THROUGH	SHOUTDOWNS	
Q7:	A	PUBLIC	UNIVERSITY	INVITES	A	VERY	CONTROVERSIAL	SPEAKER	TO	AN	ON-CAMPUS	
EVENT.	THE	SPEAKER	IS	KNOWN	FOR	MAKING	OFFENSIVE	AND	HURTFUL	STATEMENTS.	A	
STUDENT	GROUP	OPPOSED	TO	THE	SPEAKER	DISRUPTS	THE	SPEECH	BY	LOUDLY	AND	
REPEATEDLY	SHOUTING	SO	THAT	THE	AUDIENCE	CANNOT	HEAR	THE	SPEAKER.	DO	YOU	
AGREE	OR	DISAGREE	THAT	THE	STUDENT	GROUP’S	ACTIONS	ARE	ACCEPTABLE?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 51%	 62%	 39%	 45%	 51%	 51%	 47%	 57%	
Disagree	 49%	 38%	 61%	 55%	 49%	 49%	 53%	 43%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
22	 JOURNAL	OF	CONSTITUTIONAL	LAW	ONLINE	 [Vol.	20:4	
TABLE	8:	SILENCING	SPEECH	BY	BLOCKING	ACCESS	TO	THE	EVENT	VENUE	
Q8:	A	PUBLIC	UNIVERSITY	INVITES	A	VERY	CONTROVERSIAL	SPEAKER	TO	AN	ON-CAMPUS	
EVENT.	THE	SPEAKER	IS	KNOWN	FOR	MAKING	OFFENSIVE	AND	HURTFUL	STATEMENTS.	A	
STUDENT	GROUP	OPPOSED	TO	THE	SPEAKER	FORCES	CANCELLATION	OF	THE	EVENT	BY	
PHYSICALLY	BLOCKING	THE	SPEAKER’S	ACCESS	TO	THE	EVENT	VENUE.	DO	YOU	AGREE	OR	
DISAGREE	THAT	THE	STUDENT	GROUP’S	ACTIONS	ARE	ACCEPTABLE?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 40%	 48%	 30%	 36%	 40%	 41%	 35%	 47%	
Disagree	 60%	 52%	 70%	 64%	 60%	 59%	 65%	 53%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
TABLE	9:	SILENCING	SPEECH	BY	COMMITTING	VANDALISM	
Q9:	A	PUBLIC	UNIVERSITY	INVITES	A	VERY	CONTROVERSIAL	SPEAKER	TO	AN	ON-CAMPUS	
EVENT.	THE	SPEAKER	IS	KNOWN	FOR	MAKING	OFFENSIVE	AND	HURTFUL	STATEMENTS.	A	
STUDENT	GROUP	OPPOSED	TO	THE	SPEAKER	COMMITS	VANDALISM	TO	PREVENT	THE	
SPEAKER	FROM	SPEAKING.	DO	YOU	AGREE	OR	DISAGREE	THAT	THE	STUDENT	GROUP’S	
ACTIONS	ARE	ACCEPTABLE?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total	 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 23%	 24%		 28%	 19%	 22%	 26%	 14%	 35%	
Disagree	 77%	 76%		 72%	 81%	 78%	 73%		 86%	 65%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
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TABLE	10:	SILENCING	SPEECH	BY	USING	VIOLENCE	
Q10:	A	PUBLIC	UNIVERSITY	INVITES	A	VERY	CONTROVERSIAL	SPEAKER	TO	AN	ON-CAMPUS	
EVENT.	THE	SPEAKER	IS	KNOWN	FOR	MAKING	OFFENSIVE	AND	HURTFUL	STATEMENTS.	A	
STUDENT	GROUP	OPPOSED	TO	THE	SPEAKER	USES	VIOLENCE	TO	PREVENT	THE	SPEAKER	
FROM	SPEAKING.	DO	YOU	AGREE	OR	DISAGREE	THAT	THE	STUDENT	GROUP’S	ACTIONS	
ARE	ACCEPTABLE?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 19%	 20%		 22%		 16%	 18%		 21%	 10%	 30%	
Disagree	 81%	 80%		 78%		 84%	 82%		 79%	 90%	 70%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
Unsurprisingly,	the	percentage	of	respondents	who	answered	“agree”	
declines	as	the	actions	become	more	severe.	What	is	surprising	is	the	per-
centages	themselves,	with	fifty-one	percent	of	respondents	agreeing	that	
“disrupt[ing]	 the	 speech	by	 loudly	 and	 repeatedly	 shouting	 is	 acceptable	
(Table	7),	and	nineteen	percent	of	respondents	finding	it	acceptable	for	a	
student	group	to	use	violence	to	prevent	the	speech	(Table	10).	Addition-
ally,	 among	 the	 four	 tables,	 the	partisan	divide	between	Republican	and	
Democratic	students	is	largest	in	Tables	7	and	8.	The	gender	difference	in	
responses	 increases	as	the	questions	ask	about	more	violent	actions.	For	
example,	ten	percent	of	female	respondents	and	thirty	percent	of	male	re-
spondents	agree	that	it	is	acceptable	to	use	violence	in	the	vignette	associ-
ated	with	Table	10.	
It	is	interesting	to	compare	the	Villasenor	2017	survey	responses	to	this	
question	to	related	questions	from	other	surveys.	The	Economist/YouGov	
2017	survey	asked	the	same	violence	question	of	American	adults,	though,	
in	contrast	with	the	Villasenor	2017	question,	the	Economist/YouGov	2017	
survey	also	 included	a	 “not	 sure”	option.	 In	 the	Economist/YouGov	2017	
survey,	 in	 the	18-29	age	group,	which	 is	 the	age	group	corresponding	 to	
most	college	students,	the	responses	were	as	follows:	Agree:	fourteen	per-
cent;	disagree:	sixty-seven	percent;	not	sure:	nineteen	percent.58	Thus,	in	
the	Economist/YouGov	September	2017	survey,	in	response	to	the	violence	
question,	fully	a	third	of	respondents	in	the	18-29	age	group	didn’t	affirm-
atively	disagree	with	the	use	of	violence	to	silence	speech.	 In	addition,	 if	
the	“not	sure”	responses	are	removed	and	only	the	responses	among	peo-
ple	in	the	Economist/YouGov	survey	who	either	agreed	or	disagreed	in	that	
	
	58	 The	Economist/YouGov	2017	survey,	supra	note	10,	at	90.	
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question	are	considered,	 the	agree	percentage	 in	 the	18-29	age	group	 is	
slightly	over	 seventeen	percent	of	 that	 subset	of	 responses	 (obtained	by	
dividing	 14	 by	 81),	which	 is	 close	 to59	 the	 nineteen	 percent	 number	 ob-
served	in	the	Villasenor	2017	survey.60		
The	 Villasenor	 2017	 survey	 can	 also	 be	 compared	 to	 the	McLaughlin	
2017	and	the	FIRE	2017	surveys.	McLaughlin	2017	asked	whether	students	
agreed	or	disagreed	with	the	following	statement:	“If	someone	is	using	hate	
speech	or	making	racially	charged	comments,	physical	violence	can	be	jus-
tified	to	prevent	this	person	from	espousing	their	hateful	views.”	Thirty	per-
cent	of	respondents	agreed	with	this	statement.61	Support	for	violence	in	
the	McLaughlin	 question	 spanned	 the	political	 spectrum:	 Thirty-five	per-
cent	 of	 Democrats	 agreed,	 as	 did	 thirty-one	 percent	 of	 Republicans	 and	
twenty-six	percent	of	 Independents.62	The	FIRE	2017	survey	asked	a	very	
different	violence-related	question,63	finding	that	1	percent	of	respondents,	
themselves,	 stated	 that	 they	 might	 conduct	 violent	 action	 to	 prevent	 a	
speech	by	an	on-campus	guest	speaker	“with	ideas	and	opinions	I	strongly	
disagree	with.”64		
The	variation	in	views	regarding	whether	violence	is	acceptable	among	
these	four	surveys	is	reasonable	considering	the	variation	in	the	questions.	
It	is	expected	that	a	small	number	of	respondents	will	admit	to	being	willing	
to	 personally	 engage	 in	 violence	 to	 silence	 speech,	 so	 the	 FIRE	 2017	 re-
sponses	are	unsurprising.	By	contrast,	both	the	Villasenor	2017	and	Econo-
mist/YouGov	2017	surveys	asked	respondents	whether	they	considered	vi-
olent	actions	committed	by	a	student	group	to	be	acceptable.	This	led	to	
	
	59	 The	difference	of	two	percent	(i.e.,	the	difference	between	nineteen	and	seventeen	percent)	is	
below	the	margin	of	error	reported	by	the	Economist/YouGov,	which	was	three	percent	for	the	
full	 sample	of	1500	respondents,	and	would	be	 larger	 for	subsets.	 Id.	at	204.	For	 the	violence	
question	 in	 the	Economist/YouGov	2017	 survey,	 the	number	of	 respondents	 in	 the	18-29	age	
group	was	301.	This	means	that	if	the	“not	sure”	responses	are	excluded,	the	number	of	respond-
ents	aged	18-29	who	either	agreed	or	disagreed	in	this	question	is	about	244.	Id.	at	90.	
	60	 The	foregoing	sentence	addresses	the	percentages	among	the	subset	of	respondents	in	the	Econ-
omist/YouGov	2017	survey	who	either	agreed	or	disagreed	(i.e.,	removing	the	“not	sure”	respond-
ents).	As	a	separate	question,	it	is	possible	to	ask	what	the	“not	sure”	respondents	would	have	
done	if	forced	to	choose	either	agree	or	disagree.	Of	course,	 it	 is	 impossible	to	know	with	any	
certainty.	But,	it	is	at	least	reasonable	to	hypothesize	that	if	forced	to	choose,	those	“not	sure”	
respondents	(who	number	about	57,	see	id.)	would	have	chosen	agree	or	disagree	in	the	same	
proportions	as	the	respondents	who	did	initially	make	one	of	those	choices.	If	this	were	to	occur,	
this	would	again	lead	to	a	17%	“agree”	response	rate.	
	61	 See	McLaughlin	supra	note	9,	at	19.	
	62	 Id.	
	63	 The	FIRE	2017	survey	included	a	question	that	stated:	“If	a	guest	speaker	with	ideas	and	opinions	
I	strongly	disagree	with	were	invited	to	my	college	campus,	I	might	do	the	following”	and	then	
listed	a	series	of	actions,	and	asked	students	to	indicate	all	of	the	actions	that	apply.	One	of	the	
actions	listed	was	“Use	violent	or	disruptive	actions	to	prevent	the	event	from	occurring.”	FIRE	
2017,	supra	note	8,	at	14-15.	
	64	 FIRE	2017,	supra	note	8,	at	15	(stating	1%	of	survey	respondents	would	engage	in	violent	behav-
ior),	at	25	(giving	the	specific	form	of	the	question	that	was	asked).	
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“agree”	percentages	 in	the	teens	as	discussed	above.	Finally,	McLaughlin	
2017	used	a	different	framing,	asking	whether	“physical	violence	can	be	jus-
tified”	to	prevent	expression	of	hateful	views.	This	question	led	to	the	high-
est	percentage	of	respondents–	thirty	percent–agreeing	with	the	use	of	vi-
olence.	 In	 combination,	 these	 survey	 results	 the	 need	 for	 real	 concern	
about	the	potential	use	of	violence	to	silence	speech.	Of	course,	the	proper	
response	to	these	results	is	not	to	preemptively	cancel	on-campus	speeches	
that	may	lead	to	violence	by	protesters.	After	all,	this	would	simply	create	
a	feedback	cycle	in	which	threats	of	violence	would	become	a	standard	way	
for	people	to	dictate	who	could,	and	could	not,	speak	on	college	campuses.		
B.		Is	“Hate	Speech”	Constitutionally	Protected?	
While	hate	speech	is	odious,	provided	that	it	steers	clear	of	well-estab-
lished	First	Amendment	exceptions	such	as	incitements	to	imminent	law-
less	action	and	“true	threats,”	it	is	protected.		
TABLE	11:	HATE	SPEECH	
Q15:	DOES	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT	PROTECT	“HATE	SPEECH”?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public		 Private	 Female	 Male	
Yes	 39%		 39%	 44%	 40%	 38%	 43%	 31%	 51%	
No	 44%	 41%	 39%	 44%	 44%	 44%	 49%	 38%	
Don’t	know	 16%	 15%	 17%		 17%	 17%	 13%	 21%	 11%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
The	relative	consistency	across	different	political	affiliations	 in	the	re-
sponses	to	this	question	is	notable,	as	is	the	difference	in	the	responses	by	
gender.	In	no	category	except	males	did	the	fraction	of	respondents	who	
answered	“yes”	exceed	fifty	percent,	and	for	males	the	number	was	barely	
over	fifty	percent.	
It	 is	 interesting	 to	compare	the	answers	 to	 this	question	to	 the	same	
question	asked	in	the	FIRE	2017	survey.	In	the	FIRE	2017	survey,	46	percent	
of	 students	 responded	 “yes,”	 twenty-nine	 percent	 responded	 “no,”	 and	
twenty-five	percent	responded	“I	don’t	know.”	Thus,	in	both	the	Villasenor	
2017	and	FIRE	2017	surveys,	fewer	than	half	of	respondents	correctly	an-
swered	that	hate	speech	is	protected.	The	difference	in	the	“yes”	answers	
(forty-six	percent	in	FIRE	2017	and	thirty-nine	percent	in	Villasenor	2017)	is	
seven	percentage	points.	Additionally,	the	FIRE	2017	results	specific	to	the	
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subset	of	respondents	at	four-year	colleges	are	as	follows:	forty-four	per-
cent	 of	 students	 responded	 “yes,”	 thirty	 percent	 responded	 “no,”	 and	
twenty-six	percent	responded	“I	don’t’	know.”65	Thus,	when	four-year	col-
lege	student	respondents	are	considered,	the	difference	between	the	“yes”	
answers	is	five	percentage	points,	 i.e.	thirty-nine	percent	of	the	respond-
ents	 in	the	Villasenor	2017	survey,	all	of	whom	are	four	year	college	stu-
dents,	answered	“yes,”	while	forty-four	percent	of	the	FIRE	2017	four-year	
college	students	answered	“yes.”	
However,	there	is	a	larger	percentage	point	difference	between	the	Vil-
lasenor	2017	and	FIRE	2017	surveys	when	students	who	responded	“no”	
and	“I	don’t	know”	to	the	question	are	compared.	For	example,	in	the	FIRE	
2017	survey,	twenty-five	percent	of	the	respondents	(and	twenty-six	per-
cent	of	the	four-year	student	respondents)	answered	“I	don’t	know,”	and	
in	the	Villasenor	2017	survey	sixteen	percent	of	the	respondents	answered	
“I	don’t	know.”	One	possible	explanation	for	this	difference	is	that	because	
data	for	Villasenor	2017	was	collected	immediately	after	the	violent	Char-
lottesville	events,	respondents	may	have	had	Charlottesville	 in	mind	as	a	
“top-of-the-head”	factor	when	answering	questions.66	
The	McLaughlin	2017	survey	also	had	a	hate	speech	question,	though	in	
different	form.	That	survey	asked	whether	respondents	agree	or	disagree	
with	the	statement	“Hate	speech,	no	matter	how	racist	or	bigoted	it	is,	is	
still	technically	protected	under	the	First	Amendment	as	free	speech.”	Fifty-
nine	percent	of	the	respondents	stated	they	agree	and	thirty-one	percent	
state	that	they	disagree.67	The	McLaughlin	2017	publication	did	not	state	
whether	the	other	ten	percent	of	respondents	(who	are	not	in	either	the	
“agree”	or	“disagree”	category)	declined	to	answer	this	question	or	specif-
ically	chose	an	answer	such	as	“not	sure”.	
C.	Racist	Speech	
To	explore	views	on	racist	speech,	half	of	the	Villasenor	2017	respond-
ents	were	asked	question	2A,	and	the	other	half	were	asked	question	2B	
	
	65	 Provided	by	Kelsey	Ann	Naughton,	data	analyst	at	FIRE.	
	66	 See,	e.g.,	John	Zaller	&	Stanley	Feldman,	A	Simple	Theory	of	the	Survey	Response:	Answering	Ques-
tions	versus	Revealing	Preferences,	36	AM.	J.	POL.	SCI.	579,	586	(1992)	(citing	Shelley	E.	Taylor	and	
Susan	 Fisk,	 Salience,	 Attention,	 and	 Attribution:	 Top	 of	 the	 Head	 Phenomena,	 11	 ADVANCES	 IN	
EXPERIMENTAL	SOC.	PSYCHOL.	249,	252	(1978))	(discussing	“answering	on	the	basis	of	a	single	‘top-
of-the-head’	consideration”).	Zaller	&	Feldman	also	provide	what	 they	 term	the	“response	ax-
iom”:	“Individuals	answer	survey	questions	by	averaging	across	the	considerations	that	happen	
to	be	salient	at	the	moment	of	response	.	.	.”	Id.	Zaller	&	Feldman	further	tie	the	response	axiom	
to	the	“accessibility	axiom,”	under	which	“considerations	that	have	been	recently	thought	about	
are	somewhat	more	likely	to	be	sampled.”	Id.	
	67	 McLaughlin	2017,	supra	note	9,	at	17.	McLaughlin	2017	does	not	state	whether	the	10%	of	re-
spondents	not	included	in	either	“agree”	or	“disagree”	provided	an	answer	such	as	“don’t	know”	
or	whether	they	simply	declined	to	answer	this	question.	
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below.68	While	both	of	the	vignettes	describe	a	speaker	who	engages	in	rac-
ist	 speech,	 they	differ	 in	whether	 the	audience	 includes	members	of	 the	
racial	group	being	criticized	by	the	speaker.	
Q2A:	Addressing	a	group	of	people	at	a	rally	in	a	public	park,	a	speaker	says	
that	many	members	of	a	particular	racial	group	are	“lazy”	and	have	“terri-
ble	work	habits.”	The	audience	does	not	include	any	members	of	the	racial										
group	the	speaker	is	describing.	
TABLE	12A:	RACIST	SPEECH	WHEN	NO	MEMBERS	OF	THE	TARGETED	RACIAL	GROUP	ARE	
PRESENT	
VIEWS	ON	THE	STATEMENT:	“THE	SPEAKER’S	STATEMENTS	SHOULD	BE	PROTECTED	BY	
THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT.”	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 64%	 62%	 75%	 63%	 62%		 67%	 58%	 71%	
Disagree	 36%	 38%	 25%	 37%	 38%		 33%	 42%	 29%	
N	(unw.)	 754	 345	 124	 226	 556	 198	 520	 234	
	
Q2B:	Addressing	a	group	of	people	at	a	rally	in	a	public	park,	a	speaker	says	
that	many	members	of	a	particular	racial	group	are	“lazy”	and	have	“terri-
ble	work	habits.”	Some	people	in	the	audience	are	members	of	the	racial	
group	the	speaker	is	describing.	
TABLE	12B:	RACIST	SPEECH	WHEN	NO	MEMBERS	OF	THE	TARGETED	RACIAL	GROUP	ARE	
PRESENT	
VIEWS	ON	THE	STATEMENT:	“THE	SPEAKER’S	STATEMENTS	SHOULD	BE	PROTECTED	BY	
THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT.”	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 62%	 54%	 76%	 67%	 63%		 58%	 57%	 69%	
Disagree	 38%	 46%	 24%	 33%	 37%		 42%	 43%	 31%	
N	(unw.)	 746	 352	 137	 205	 560	 ‘186	 520	 226	
	
The	speech	discussed	in	these	vignettes,	while	odious,	is	protected	by	
	
	68	 754	of	the	1500	respondents	answered	question	Q2A	and	746	of	the	respondents	answered	ques-
tion	Q2B.	
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the	First	Amendment.	However	more	than	one-third	of	respondents	(thirty-
eight	percent)	thought	that	this	speech	should	not	be	protected.	Interest-
ingly,	political	affiliation,	type	of	college	a	respondent	attends,	and	gender	
did	not	result	in	sizable	differences	in	attitudes	toward	racial	speech.	It	is	
also	interesting	to	compare	the	answers	to	the	above	questions	with	a	FIRE	
2017	survey	question,	which	asked	respondents	“Should	the	First	Amend-
ment	to	the	Constitution	protect	hate	speech?”	Thirty-five	percent	of	the	
respondents	to	this	FIRE	2017	question	answered	“yes”,	forty-eight	percent	
answered	 “no”,	 and	 seventeen	 percent	 answered	 “I	 don’t	 know.”69	 Of	
course,	the	questions	in	two	surveys	are	different:	FIRE	was	asking	a	general	
question	 about	whether	 hate	 speech	 should	 be	 protected,	while	 the	 re-
sponses	in	Tables	12A	and	12B	related	to	a	Villasenor	2017	question	reciting	
a	specific	example	of	hate	speech	and	asking	whether	the	speech	in	that	
example	should	be	protected.	These	differences	in	the	questions	are	an	im-
portant	caveat	to	any	comparison.	With	that	caveat,	the	differences	in	the	
answer	percentages	are	notable.	
D.	Does	the	First	Amendment	Require	Counterpoints	to	Offensive	Speech?	
The	First	Amendment	does	not	require	that	hosts	of	on-campus	events	
provide	an	opportunity	to	hear	counterpoints.70	This	understanding,	how-
ever,	was	not	widespread	among	respondents,	when	asked	the	following	
question	in	Villasenor	2017:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	69	 FIRE	2017,	supra	note	8,	at	17.	
	70	 In	a	different	context,	the	issue	of	counterpoints	has	a	complex	history.	For	example,	the	“fairness	
doctrine”	policy	of	the	Federal	Communications	Commission	was	introduced	in	1949,	upheld	by	
the	Supreme	Court	as	constitutional	in	Red	Lion	Broad.	Co.	v.	FCC,	395	U.S.	367	(1969),	and	then	
rescinded	by	the	FCC	in	1987.	See	also	Syracuse	Peace	Council	v.	FCC,	867	F.2d	654,	655-56	(D.C.	
Cir.	1989)	(upholding	the	FCC’s	decision	to	revoke	the	“fairness	doctrine,”	though	not	on	consti-
tutional	grounds).	
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TABLE	13:	WHETHER	COUNTERPOINTS	ARE	REQUIRED	
Q14:	CONSIDER	AN	EVENT,	HOSTED	AT	A	PUBLIC	U.S.	UNIVERSITY	BY	AN	ON-CAMPUS	
ORGANIZATION,	FEATURING	A	SPEAKER	KNOWN	FOR	MAKING	STATEMENTS	THAT	MANY	
STUDENTS	CONSIDER	TO	BE	OFFENSIVE	AND	HURTFUL.	A	STUDENT	GROUP	OPPOSED	TO	
THE	SPEAKER	ISSUES	A	STATEMENT	SAYING	THAT,	UNDER	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT,	THE	
ON-CAMPUS	ORGANIZATION	HOSTING	THE	EVENT	IS	LEGALLY	REQUIRED	TO	ENSURE	THAT	
THE	EVENT	INCLUDES	NOT	ONLY	THE	OFFENSIVE	SPEAKER	BUT	ALSO	A	SPEAKER	WHO	
PRESENTS	AN	OPPOSING	VIEW.	WHAT	IS	YOUR	VIEW	ON	THE	STUDENT	GROUP’S	
STATEMENT?	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total	 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 62%	 65%	 62%	 58%	 63%	 60%	 60%	 66%	
Disagree	 38%	 35%	 38%	 42%	 37%	 40%	 40%	 34%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
Sixty-two	percent	 of	 respondents	 overall	 (and	 in	 all	 categories,	more	
than	half	of	 respondents)	expressed	a	belief	 that	a	 counterpoint	was	 re-
quired.	Some	of	the	respondents	who	agreed	with	this	question	are	likely	
confusing	good	event	design,	which	can	often	benefit	 from	providing	at-
tendees	with	opportunities	to	hear	multiple	viewpoints,	with	First	Amend-
ment	compliance,	which	is	of	course	silent	on	whether	a	single	viewpoint,	
or	multiple	viewpoints,	are	offered.	
E.	Should	Colleges	Shield	Students	from	Offensive	Speech?	
Villasenor	2017	also	asked	students	 to	choose	what	an	 ideal	 learning	
environment	would	be.	This	question	was	identical	to	a	question	asked	sev-
eral	other	surveys.	
Q16:	If	you	had	to	choose	one	of	the	options	below,	which	do	you	think	it	is	
more	important	for	colleges	to	do?		
Option	1:	create	a	positive	learning	environment	for	all	students	by	prohib-
iting	certain	speech	or	expression	of	viewpoints	that	are	offensive	or	biased	
against	certain	groups	of	people		
Option	2:	create	an	open	learning	environment	where	students	are	exposed	
to	all	types	of	speech	and	viewpoints,	even	if	it	means	allowing	speech	that	
is	offensive	or	biased	against	certain	groups	of	people?	
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TABLE	14:	PREFERRED	COLLEGE	ENVIRONMENT	
	 	 Political	Affiliation	 Type	of	college	 Gender	
	 Total		 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public		 Private	 Female	 Male	
Option	 1	
(positive)	 53%		 61%	 47%	 45%	 53%	 54%	 52%	 55%	
Option	2	
(open)	 47%	 39%	 53%	 55%		 47%	 46%	 48%	 45%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
For	comparison,	the	results	from	the	Gallup	2016	survey	on	this	ques-
tion	are	as	follows:71	
		
	 Total	 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public	 Private	 Female	 Male	
Option	1	
(positive)	 22	 28	 15	 18	 NA	 NA	 28	 16	
Option	2	
(open)	 78	 72	 84	 81	 NA	 NA	 72	 83	
	
And,	 yet	another	data	 source	on	 this	question	 is	 found	 in	 the	Econo-
mist/YouGov	September	2017	survey,	which	asked	this	question	and	for	the	
18-29	age	group	and	had	responses	of:	Option	1:	thirty-two	percent;	Option	
2:	 forty-seven	 percent;	 Not	 Sure:	 twenty-three	 percent.72	 Further,	 if	 the	
“not	 sure”	 answers	 are	 removed	 and	 the	 Economist/YouGov	 September	
2017	 answers	 are	 recomputed	 only	 for	 the	 subset	 of	 respondents	 who	
chose	either	Option	1	or	Option	2,	 the	percentages	are:	Option	1:	 thirty-
nine	percent;	Option	2:	sixty-one	percent.		
It	is	notable	that	the	tabulations	for	this	question	vary	so	much	between	
surveys.	 Gallup	 2016	 finds	 that	 twenty-two	 percent	 of	 students	want	 to	
learn	 in	the	“positive	 learning	environment,	while	the	Economist/YouGov	
2016	found	that	thirty	percent	of	respondents	in	the	18-29	age	group	want	
this	(and	additionally	twenty-three	percent	were	not	sure).	And,	as	noted	
above,	 the	 among	 the	 Villasenor	 2017	 respondents,	 fifty-three	 percent	
made	this	choice.	There	are	several	possible	causes	for	these	divergences,	
including	differences	in	methodology	across	the	various	surveys	as	well	as	
differences	 in	 the	 target	population	 (the	Economist/YouGov	2017	 survey	
was	an	adult	sample,	and	the	respondents	in	the	18-29	year	age	group	likely	
	
	71	 Gallup	2016,	supra	note	6,	at	12.	
	72	 Economist/YouGov	2017,	supra	note	10,	at	95.	
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included	respondents	who	were	not	college	students).	In	addition,	the	dif-
ferent	respective	times	of	data	collection	for	Gallup	2016,	which	took	place	
in	early	2016,	 the	Villasenor	2017	survey,	which	collected	data	 in	August	
2017,	and	the	Economist/YouGov	2017	survey,	which	collected	data	in	Sep-
tember	2017,	may	have	impacted	responses	to	this	question	(in	particular	
through	the	“top	of	the	head”	phenomenon	in	August	2017,	and	perhaps	
to	a	lesser	degree	in	September	2017),73	though	the	precise	extent	of	this	
timing	effect	is	unknowable.	
CONCLUSION	
There	are	several	conclusions	suggested	by	the	results	presented	above.	
In	some	respects,	many	respondents	have	an	overly	narrow	understanding	
of	the	scope	of	expression	that	 is	protected	under	the	First	Amendment.	
For	example,	many	respondents	indicated	a	belief	that	hate	speech,	includ-
ing	racist	speech,	is	unprotected	by	the	First	Amendment,	and	that	the	First	
Amendment	requires	 the	presentation	of	counterpoints.	Relatedly,	many	
respondents	 also	 consider	 it	 acceptable	 to	 silence	 offensive	 viewpoints	
through	a	variety	of	mechanisms,	up	 to	and	 including	violence.	Thus,	on	
these	issues	many	respondents	have	an	overly	narrow	view	of	the	scope	of	
expression	that	is	protected	under	the	First	Amendment.	
Yet	there	are	other	respects	in	which	a	sizable	percentage	of	respond-
ents	have	an	overly	broad	conception	of	freedom	of	expression,	believing,	
for	example,	that	incitements	to	imminent	lawless	action	are	constitution-
ally	permitted,	and	that	defamation	is	constitutionally	protected	when	it	is	
done	 in	 response	 to	 being	 treated	 rudely.	 Finally,	 in	 relation	 to	 “true	
threats,”	the	lack	of	clarity	among	respondents	regarding	subjective/objec-
tive	evaluation	criteria	illustrates	the	complexity	of	this	issue—and	suggests	
that	even	if	the	Supreme	Court	eventually	articulates	an	explicit	constitu-
tional	(as	opposed	to	statutory74)	position,	jurors	in	lower	courts	may	find	
it	difficult	to	apply.75	
	
	73	 See	supra,	note	67	and	accompanying	text.			
	74	 The	Elonis	decision	on	this	issue	was	limited	to	the	statute	in	question,	18	U.S.C.	§	875(c);	as	noted	
earlier	in	this	Essay	the	Court	did	not	reach	the	question	of	what	the	First	Amendment	itself	re-
quires	in	relation	to	the	subjective/objective	issue	in	the	context	of	“true	threats.”	See	supra,	Part	
IV,	at	15.	
	75	 An	additional	conclusion	worth	noting	is	that	while	type	of	college	(public	or	private)	was	one	of	
the	categories	presented	in	the	tables	herein,	for	most	responses	there	was	very	little	difference	
between	the	percentages	shown	for	public	college	respondents	and	private	college	respondents	
(in	nearly	all	cases	the	differences	are	no	more	than	five	percent	and	in	most	cases	the	differences	
are	in	the	range	from	zero	to	three	percent).	Thus,	while	public	and	private	colleges	operate	under	
very	different	legal	frameworks	with	respect	to	the	First	Amendment	(public	colleges,	as	govern-
ment	entities,	have	First	Amendment	obligations),	the	results	of	this	survey	suggest	that	whether	
a	student	attends	a	private	or	public	college	has	little	impact	on	student	views	on	the	issues	ex-
plored	herein.	
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More	generally,	these	results	show	that	there	is	a	divergence	between	
what	might	be	called	theory	and	practice	when	discussing	views	among	re-
spondents	regarding	the	First	Amendment.	(A	related	observation	was	pro-
vided	in	Gallup	2016,	which	noted	that	“[c]ollege	students	are	supportive	
of	First	Amendment	rights	in	the	abstract,	but	many	are	comfortable	with	
certain	restrictions	on	those	rights.”76)	In	the	Villasenor	2017	survey,	many	
respondents	are,	in	theory,	very	supportive	of	the	First	Amendment.	Con-
sider	the	following	two	questions	that	were	also	asked	in	the	survey,	and	
the	associated	responses:	
TABLE	15:	CURRENT	IMPORTANCE	OF	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT	RELATIVE	TO	THE	PAST	
Q5:	EVEN	THOUGH	THERE	HAVE	BEEN	MANY	DEVELOPMENTS	IN	COMMUNICATIONS	AND	
TECHNOLOGY	SINCE	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT	WAS	WRITTEN	SUCH	AS	THE	INVENTION	OF	
THE	INTERNET,	TODAY	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT	IS	STILL	AS	IMPORTANT	AS	IT	WAS	IN	THE	
LATE	1700S.	
	 Total	 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public		 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 91%	 90%	 94%	 92%	 91%	 91%	 90%	 92%	
Disagree	 	9%	 10%	 6%	 		8%	 		9%	 		9%	 10%	 		8%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
TABLE	16:	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT	AS	A	RELEVANT	AND	IMPORTANT	PART	OF	
AMERICAN	DEMOCRACY	
Q6:	IN	TODAY’S	SOCIETY,	THE	FIRST	AMENDMENT	IS	RELEVANT	AND	AN	IMPORTANT	
PART	OF	AMERICAN	DEMOCRACY.	
	 Total	 Dem	 Rep	 Ind	 Public		 Private	 Female	 Male	
Agree	 94%	 95%	 95%	 93%	 93%	 96%	 94%	 94%	
Disagree	 		6%	 		5%	 		5%	 		7%	 		7%	 		4%	 		6%	 		6%	
N	(unw.)	 1500	 697	 261	 431	 1116	 384	 1040	 460	
	
As	these	results	when	combined	with	the	data	presented	earlier	make	
clear,	 there	 is	 extremely	 strong	 theoretical	 support	 for	 the	 First	Amend-
ment	 among	 respondents,	 but	 (particularly	 with	 respect	 to	 offensive	
speech)	substantially	less	support	for	specific	expression	that	is	protected	
under	the	First	Amendment.	Stated	another	way,	many	respondents	 lack	
sufficient	understanding	of	what	forms	of	expression	the	First	Amendment	
	
	76	 Gallup	2016,	supra	note	6,	at	12.	
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does	and	does	not	protect.		
Part	of	the	solution	involves	increased	education—not	only	in	college,	
but	perhaps	even	more	importantly,	prior	to	college—regarding	constitu-
tional	principles,	including	the	Bill	of	Rights,	and	more	specifically	the	First	
Amendment,	and	more	specifically	still,	the	nature	of	the	freedoms	it	con-
fers.	 However,	 education	 alone	 would	 be	 unlikely	 to	 resolve	 the	 diver-
gences	 identified	above	between	the	actual	and	perceived	scope	of	free-
dom	of	expression.	Another	factor	is	likely	the	view	that	opinions	that	might	
make	some	students	uncomfortable	have	no	place	in	on-campus	dialogue.	
This	creates	censorship	pressure,77	and	reduces	the	opportunity	for	debate	
on	the	many	complex	issues	on	which	reasonable	people	can	have	diver-
gent	(and	in	some	cases,	as	perceived	by	some	people,	potentially	offen-
sive)	views.	Efforts	to	increase	tolerance	for	viewpoint	diversity	can	be	help-
ful	in	this	regard.	Furthermore,	there	is	the	interesting	question	of	the	role	
of	university	faculty	and	administrators	in	relation	to	on-campus	views	of	
freedom	of	expression.	A	survey	of	faculty	and	administrators	would	pro-
vide	an	additional	important	source	of	data	on	the	broader	question	of	the	
on-campus	climate	for	free	expression.		
As	both	the	survey	that	is	the	focus	of	this	Essay	as	well	as	other	surveys	
cited	herein	have	made	clear,	free	expression	is	an	important	challenge	in	
today’s	colleges.	College	students,	faculty,	and	staff	can	play	a	vital	role	in	
addressing	 this	 challenge	by	working	 to	 improve	 the	 campus	 climate	 for	
viewpoint	diversity,	and	by	emphasizing	that	the	discussions	that	ultimately	
end	up	being	the	most	valuable,	enlightening,	and	informative	are	not	al-
ways	those	that	ensure	that	all	participants	stay	in	their	comfort	zones.	
	
	
	77	 See,	e.g.,	 the	Fire	2017	survey,	supra	note	8,	at	9,	stating	that	“At	 least	half	of	students	(54%)	
agree	that	they	have	stopped	themselves	from	sharing	an	idea	or	opinion	in	class	at	some	point	
since	beginning	college.”	(parentheses	in	original).	
